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WARRANT NULLIFICATION
L. Joe Dunman*
ABSTRACT

Police officers execute thousands ofsearch warrants in the United States
every year, often lookingfor drugs in people's homes. Many search warrantsare
executed by militarized "dynamic entry" teams who violently conduct raids late
at night with little or no warning, guns drawn. These raids have killed and injured hundreds ofpeople nationwide-notjust suspects but also officers and bystanders. Protestserupt in response, the community divides, and trust in institutions crumbles.
Legislative and executive policy can reduce the violence of search warrant executions, but could there also be a judicialoption? This Article explores
one such option: nullification. Like other actors in the criminaljustice system,
judges can nullify the law, selectively turning off the punitive and violent machine
of criminaljustice by refusing to ratify militarizedlaw enforcement action.
Judges have the power to reduce the violence and disorder caused by
militarizedpolice raids by simply denying search warrant applicationseven if
there is probable cause to approve them. This Article defines thisjudicialpower
of warrant nullification, assesses the violent toll of search warrants, and proposes three pragmatic (as opposed to politicalor partisan)basesfor radicaljudicial action:judicial independence, harm reduction, and community stability.
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INTRODUCTION

"

"The first lesson, simple as it is, is that whatever court we are in, whatever we are doing, whether we are on a trial court or an appellate court, at the
end of our task some human being is going to be affected. Some human life is
going to be changed in some way by what we do . . .
-Justice David Souter'
Police officers execute thousands of search warrants in the United States
every year, often looking for drugs in people's homes. Many search warrants are
executed by militarized "dynamic entry" teams who violently conduct raids late
at night with little or no warning, guns drawn. These raids have killed and injured
hundreds of people nationwide-not just suspects but also officers and bystanders. The aftermath of these raids can also be violent (especially when they "go
wrong" due to police malfeasance, recklessness, or negligence) as protesters take
to the streets, often peacefully but sometimes not. Riot police and counter-protesters then respond with more violence. The community divides along political
or racial grounds, and trust in institutions crumbles.
Legislative and executive policy can reduce the violence of search warrant executions and their aftermath, but could there also be a judicial option? This
Article suggests one such option: nullification. Like other actors in the criminal
justice system, such as juries and prosecutors, judges can nullify the law, selectively turning off the punitive and violent machine of criminal justice by refusing
to ratify militarized law enforcement action.
Judges have the power to reduce the violence and disorder caused by
militarized police raids by simply denying search warrant applications even
when there is probable cause to approve them. This Article defines this judicial
power of warrant nullification, assesses the violent toll of search warrants, and
seeks a pragmatic (as opposed to political or partisan) basis for radical judicial
action. It proposes three justifications: judicial independence, harm reduction,
and community stability.
Part II of this Article describes the three chief actors in American criminal law (juries, prosecutors, and judges) and explores the basic scope of their
nullification powers. Part III describes the sources and scope of judicial power
to nullify search warrants. There are three main sources of this power: immunity,
discretion, and job security. Part IV assesses the violent toll of search warrants

Excerptsfrom FirstSenate Session on the Souter Nomination, N.Y. TMEs (Sept. 14, 1990),

https://www.nytimes.com/1 990/09/14/us/excerpts-from-first-senate-session-on-the-souter-nomination.html.
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in the United States. Part V offers three pragmatic justifications for search warrant nullification. The first is judicial independence. The second is harm reduction. Finally, concern for community stability can justify search warrant rejections.
Violent police raids cause chaos not just for the residents of the home
being raided but also in society as a whole, because violent police searches fuel
protests, reactionary counter-violence, and distrust in institutions. The practical
consequences of search warrants are now often so severe that pragmatic judges
may find nullification a reasonable method to preserve peace and order in the
larger community when the "rule of law" itself causes chaos. In other words,
nullification may be justified when the law enforcement methods used to catch
criminals are worse, on balance, than the crimes themselves.
II.

NULLIFICATION IN CRIMINAL LAW

In the American criminal justice system, there are three actors who "ap2
ply the law": the jury, the prosecutor, and the judge.
In a criminal trial, the prosecutor applies the law by pursuing the conviction of a defendant under the prevailing criminal code. The prosecutor convicts
the defendant by proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt within the constraints
of that code and of procedural and evidentiary rules. The judge applies the law
by granting or denying procedural motions, sustaining or overruling evidentiary
objections, and giving instructions to the jurors for their deliberation. The jury
then applies the law by determining whether the prosecutor has carried their burden and proven guilt-as defined by the judge's instructions-and by rendering
a verdict. To protect their independence, each of these three actors is given wide
discretion and immunity from negative consequences.
Just as this combination of discretion and immunity gives each actor
great power to apply the law, it also gives them great power to nullify the law
through action or inaction. To nullify something is to strip it of force or validity,
3
make it void, and make it of no consequence. To nullify the law is to effectively
turn it off. Through nullification, each of these actors can render the prevailing
4
criminal code a mere "form of words" if they so choose, even if the law should
apply to the case or process before them. Consider how nullification works for
each of these actors.

Defendants are not actors because they do not apply the law. The law is applied to them.
Nullify, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nullify (last
3
visited Oct. 1, 2021); Null and Void, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/null%20and%20void (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).
2

Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (noting that the gov4
ernment's attempt to use copies of materials seized unlawfully against criminal defendants effectively rendered the Fourth Amendment meaningless).
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Jury Nullification

The jury is the most notorious nullifying actor in criminal law.5 A jury
nullifies criminal law when it acquits a defendant "even when its findings as to
the facts, if literally applied to the law as stated by the judge, would have resulted
in a conviction." 6 Though the prosecution may prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, a nullifying jury may still acquit and set the criminal free. This disregard
for the law is criminally unpunishable and procedurally non-reversible. 7
Jury nullification is a collective act that can be motivated by political
ideology, values, or, more generally, conscience. Depending on whom you ask,
though, jury nullification is either an invaluable democratic safeguard against
tyranny or such a threat to the rule of law that no one should utter its name in
court.

In 1852, American political philosopher Lysander Spooner wrote that a
jury, as they deliberate on a defendant's guilt, should also "judge whether there
really be any such law."8 The jury, in its role as the "palladium of liberty," must
also judge "the existence" and "the justice" of the law under which the defendant
had been charged. 9 Spooner thought the jury should function as a super-legislature of sorts. Nearly half a century later, foundational legal realist Roscoe Pound
wrote that jury nullification (or "jury lawlessness," as he put it) "is the great corrective of law in its actual administration."' 0 Nullification, Pound argued, was an
important obstacle to "the will of the state at large imposed on a reluctant community" and to "the will of a majority imposed on a vigorous and determined
minority."" Today, advocacy organizations like the Fully Informed Jury Association tell prospective jurors that they "have the right to vote [their] conscience,
even if it means setting aside the law to conscientiously acquit someone who has
technically broken the law.""
Courts and legislatures, on the other hand, generally despise jury nullification. According to some judges, a jury that nullifies is a threat to the very rule

5
An exhaustive exploration of the history and literature of jury nullification is not necessary
for this Article, but interested readers are highly encouraged to see Teresa L. Conway, Carol L.
Mutz, & Joann M. Ross, Jury Nullification: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 39 VAL. U. L.
REV. 393 (2004).
6

6

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY

J.

KING, &

ORIN S.

KERR, CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE § 22.1(g) (4th ed. 2020).
7
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that nullification
is "an unreviewable and unreversible [sic] power in the jury, to acquit in disregard of the instruc-

tions on the law given by the trial judge").
8

LYSANDER SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON THE TRIAL BY JURY 10 (1852).

9

Id.
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12, 18 (1910).
Id.
Called for Jury Duty?, FULLY INFORMED JURY ASS'N, https://fija.org/library-and-re-

10
"
12

sources/library/called-for-jury-duty.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
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of law, and jurors willing to nullify must be rooted out for lack of impartiality.13
Some state laws make even the suggestion of nullification criminal "tampering,"
14
an illegal effort to coerce a jury's verdict.
First, the judges. Since just before the turn of the twentieth century, fedstate judges have repeatedly rejected the idea that jurors have any right
and
eral
to nullify.' 5 Although, practically speaking, a jury has "the raw power to set an
accused free for any reason or no reason," courts insist that their primary duty is
to apply the law as instructed.' 6 From this perspective, nullification is something
the jury can do but should not feel entitled to do. Judge Learned Hand wrote for
the Second Circuit in Seiden v. United States, that, although nullification is
within the power of the jury, "it is not within their right; they are as much bound
by the law as a court."' 7 Seventy years later, Judge Richard Posner echoed this
sentiment for the Seventh Circuit in his familiar pragmatic terms: "Jury nullification is a fact, because the government cannot appeal an acquittal; it is not a
8
right, either of the jury or of the defendant." It is "unreasonable" and "lawless"
9
to exercise the power of nullification, Posner warned.' A year later, Judge Jose
Cabranes of the Second Circuit wrote in United States v. Thomas that "[w]e categorically reject the idea that, in a society committed to the rule of law, jury
nullification is desirable or that courts may permit it to occur when it is within
their authority to prevent." 20 A court can dismiss any potential juror who intends

1
"

State v. McClanahan, 510 P.2d 153, 158 (Kan. 1973).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-609 (West 1989).

See, e.g., Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 134 (1956) ("The role of the jury in a federal
criminal case is to decide only the issues of fact, taking the law as given by the court."); Hepner v.
15

United States, 213 U.S. 103, 114 (1909) ("Even in technical criminal cases it is the duty of the jury
to accept the law as declared by the court."); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101 (1895)
("Public and private safety alike would be in peril if. . . juries in criminal cases may, of right,
disregard the law as expounded to them by the court, and become a law unto themselves.").
16
United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis added); see also
United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1027 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Although jurors may indeed have

the power to ignore the law, their duty is to apply the law as interpreted by the court and they

should be so instructed.").
17
16 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1926)
18
United States. v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Medley v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 190, 191 (Ky. 1985) ("The right to disbelieve the evidence does not equate to
the right to disregard the law."); but see United States v. Leach, 632 F.2d 1337, 1341 n.12 (5th Cir.
Unit A 1980) ("Jury nullification-the right of a jury to acquit for whatever reasons even though
the evidence supports a conviction-is an important part of the jury trial system guaranteed by the

Constitution.") (emphasis added).
19
Perez, 86 F.3d at 736.
20

116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997).
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to nullify.2' So strong is the judicial sentiment against jury nullification, many
judges have even taken to law reviews and symposiums to disparage it further.22
Perhaps the strongest judicial rejection of jury nullification comes from
Judge Simon Sobeloff of the Fourth Circuit in the case of United States v. Moylan:
To encourage individuals to make their own determinations as
to which laws they will obey and which they will permit themselves as a matter of conscience to disobey is to invite chaos. No
legal system could long survive if it gave every individual the
option of disregarding with impunity any law which by his personal standard was judged morally untenable. Toleration of such
conduct would not be democratic, as appellants claim, but inevitably anarchic. 23
Meanwhile, Congress and state legislatures have passed prohibitions on
jury tampering that arguably curtail even the mention of jury nullification by its
advocates. The federal government24 and some states make jury tampering a felony. In Colorado, for example, it is a "class 5 felony" to communicate "directly
or indirectly" with a juror in an effort to influence a juror's vote in a case.2 5 Other
states, like Michigan, consider the same general behavior to be a misdemeanor. 26
So, under the language of these laws, a person telling a juror directly, "you should
nullify the law in this case" would likely be a crime, but so too might be yelling,
"jurors should nullify in that case" as they pass by outside.
The precise scope of these prohibitions has recently been tested. In Colorado, police arrested two nullification advocates outside the state courthouse in
Denver for violating the state law against jury tampering. 27 They were handing
out pamphlets about jury nullification to anyone who identified themselves as
jurors reporting for duty. 28 The trial court dismissed the charges. 29 On appeal, the

21

Id.

22

Lawrence W. Crispo, Jill M. Slansky, & Geanene M. Yriatre, JuryNullification:Law Versus

Anarchy, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1, 52 (1997) ("Voir dire must guard against nullification so that
passion, mercy, bias, or prejudice does not determine the outcome of trials."); John Bissell, Comments on Jury Nullification, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51, 55 (1997) ("No jury or juror has the
right to purposefully disregard the court's instructions on the law applicable to a case."); Rebecca

Love Kourlis, Not Jury Nullification;Not a Callfor EthicalReform; But Rathera Casefor Judicial
Control, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1109 (1996) ("1 find jury nullification akin to anarchy .... It
is intolerable in an ordered society.").
23
417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969).
24
18 U.S.C.A. § 1503 (West 2021).
25
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-609(1)-(2) (West 1989).

§ 750.120a(1)

26

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

27

People v. lannicelli, 449 P.3d 387, 389 (Colo. 2019).

28

Id.

29

Id. at 390.

(West 2021).
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Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal because the state law prohibits
influencing a juror's decision "in a case," and the men did not ask any of the
passing jurors if they were serving in any particular cases, just whether they were
30
reporting for jury duty in general.
Roughly the same situation occurred in Michigan. Police arrested defendant Keith Wood for handing out jury nullification pamphlets in front of a
state courthouse. 31 Unlike his counterparts in Colorado, however, a jury actually
32
convicted Wood for violating the state jury tampering law. The Supreme Court
of Michigan reversed his conviction, however, because, similar to Colorado's,
the Michigan jury tampering statute prohibits attempts to influence a juror "in
any case," and Wood did not single out jurors assigned to any specific cases for
33
his literature distribution.
Though the defendants in both of those cases were let off the hook, neither state's supreme court struck down their respective jury tampering statutes as
unconstitutional, nor did they categorically exclude nullification advocacy from
the statutory purview. Had any of the pamphleteers targeted jurors in specific
cases, they very well could have been convicted.
While dozens of scholars and judges have endlessly theorized and debated jury nullification, nullification by the two more powerful actors in American criminal law-the prosecutor and the judge-has received somewhat less
attention.

ProsecutorialNullification

B.

Of the three actors in American criminal law, prosecutors are the most
powerful. 34 Judges guide the trial process and juries determine guilt or innocence,
but due to the outsized frequency of plea bargaining and an ongoing legislative
impulse to criminalize more and more behavior, "[t]he fate of most of those accused of crime is determined by prosecutors."" Prosecutors decide who to charge
and how, who to bargain with and how, and, in some jurisdictions, whether to
36
investigate in the first place. They exercise this great power with absolute im37
munity from lawsuits for tort damages and civil rights violations.

30

Id. at 397.

31

People v. Wood, 954 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Mich. 2020).

32

Id. at 498.

33

Id. at 503.

34

Zohra Ahmed, The Sanctuary of ProsecutorialNullification, 83 ALB. L. REv. 239, 240

(2020).
35

James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1522

(1981).
36

Id. at 1524-25.

37

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
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Just as they can decide to charge a suspect with a crime, prosecutors can
also decide not to charge a suspect, even if the law is clear and the evidence of
guilt is overwhelming, and, in most cases, this is simply seen as an exercise of
the wide discretion prosecutors enjoy. 38 However, a prosecutor can nullIfy the
law when they have "sufficient evidence to secure a conviction . .. but declines
prosecution because of a disagreement with that law or because of the belief that
application of that law ... would be unwise or unfair." 39 In other words, prosecutors nullify when the law conflicts with their conscience. 40
Distinguishing between discretion and nullification is not always easy,
if possible at all, in many cases. As Roger Fairfax, Jr. explains, because prosecutors have the "ability to exercise unreviewable discretion," "it may be the case
that the role played by the public prosecutor makes prosecutorial nullification
simply a part of the prosecutor's 'job description. '41 Perhaps the only meaningful way to separate simple acts of discretion from outright nullification is to assess the underlying motivation. Nullification is generally the exercise of a prosecutor's personal politics or values, as opposed to their discretion, which is
limited to pragmatic choices in individual cases based on the quality of evidence,
allocation of resources, public relations impact, concurrent proceedings in other
jurisdictions, etcetera. Regardless, no matter how an individual decision not to
prosecute is labeled, prosecutors can and sometimes do nullify the law.
There are some contemporary examples of prosecutorial nullification. In
2018, Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner announced that his staff
would no longer pursue criminal charges for marijuana possession, though state
law still criminalizes it. 42 Elsewhere, in St. Louis County, Missouri, prosecutor
Wesley Bell stated that his office would no longer criminally prosecute failure
to pay child support cases, even though it remains a crime under state law. 43 In
addition, following a massive outbreak of anti-police-brutality protests across the
United States in 2020, Oregon's Multnomah County District Attorney Mike

38
39

Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., ProsecutorialNullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1262 (2011).
Id. at 1252.

40
Not all prosecutors can exercise their conscience. Chief prosecutors, who set office policy,
may exercise their conscience while subordinates must follow their orders.
41
42

Fairfax Jr., supra note 38, at 1267.
35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 780-113 (West 2021); Joe Trinacria, Larry Krasner
Sues Big Pharma, Drops All Marijuana Possession Charges, PHILA. MAG. (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://www.phillymag.com/news/2018/02/16/krasner-big-pharma-marijuana-possession/.

43
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.040 (West 2017); Sam Clancy, Wesley Bell's Office Announces Policy Changes Including Bond Reform, MarijuanaProsecution, KSDK (Jan. 2, 2019, 7:52 PM),
https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/politics/wesley-bells-office-announces-policy-changes-including-bond-reform-marijuana-prosecution/63-288d0f14-d7ed-4688-bccc-d7c8430f32a3.
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'

Schmidt declared that his office would no longer prosecute misdemeanor of44
fenses including disorderly conduct and interference with a police officer.
While Schmidt's decision had a pragmatic angle (mitigating a dramatically increased caseload) all of these examples are categorical changes in policy better
attributed to "progressive" values or conscience than to case-by-case review."
To say that prosecutors enjoy great power of discretion or nullification
is not to say that they operate without any accountability. Unlike jurors, prosecutors work under electoral and institutional pressures of various sorts. For example, chief state prosecutors are usually elected, and thus must answer to voters
46
should they act contrary to the public will. Others, especially lower in the office
hierarchy, must conform to supervisor expectations and department policy to
maintain their employment. 47 Moreover, city or county prosecutors who choose
to nullify certain laws may face jurisdictional backlash from state legislatures
and police agencies. 48 In Pennsylvania, for example, lawmakers passed a bill in
2019 giving the state attorney general the power to pursue gun crimes left unen49
forced by local Philadelphia prosecutors. In Oregon in 2020, U.S. Marshals
deputized Oregon State Police ("OSP") officers to circumvent a local prosecu50
tor's decision not to prosecute anti-police demonstrators who resist arrest. Deputizing the OSP troopers gave federal prosecutors jurisdiction to charge tougher
5
federal crimes if demonstrators refuse to submit peacefully.

KTVZ News Sources, ProsecutorWon't Act on Low-Level PortlandProtestArrests, KTVZ
44
NEWS CHANNEL 21 (Aug. 11, 2020, 2:49 PM), https://ktvz.com/news/oregon-northwest/2020/08/11 /porland-da-announces-new-policy-wont-prosecute-protest-charges/.
Whether there can even be such a thing as a "progressive prosecutor" is hotly contested. See
45
generally Maybell Romero, RuralSpaces, Communities of Color, and the ProgressiveProsecutor,
110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803 (2020); Note, The Paradoxof "ProgressiveProsecution",
132 HARv. L. REv. 748 (2018); Gyasi Lake, There's No Such Thing as a "ProgressiveProsecutor"
in a System Designed to Criminalize Blackness, BLACK YOUTH PROJECT (July 10, 2019),

http://blackyouthproj ect.com/theres-no-such-thing-as-a-progressive-prosecutor-in-a-system-designed-to-criminalize-blackness/; Jacob Rosenberg, Can a ProsecutorEver Truly be Progressive?
Ferguson May be the Ultimate Test Case, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.motherj ones.com/crime-justice/2019/04/progressive-prosecutors-ferguson-wesley-bell-kamala-harriskim-gardener/.

4

Fairfax, Jr., supra note 38, at 1268.

47

Id. at 1272.

48

Id. at 1271.

4

Michael Tanenbaum, New Law Gives Pa. Attorney GeneralPower to Prosecute Gun Cases

Dropped by Philly District Attorney Larry Krasner, PHILLY VOICE (July 9, 2019),
https://www.phillyvoice.com/arry-krasner-philadelphia-act-58-pennsylvania-gun-cases-fopshapiro/.
5
Jared Cowley, OSP Troopers Have Been Deputized by the Federal Government. Here's
What That Means, KGW8 (Sept. 2, 2020, 4:25 PM), https://www.kgw.com/article/news/local/pro-

tests/oregon-state-police-troopers-deputized-by-federal-government/283-37a20404-cb6e-45029dde-441bff3347a9.
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West 2021) (providing that assaulting or resisting a federal
5
officer with physical force is a felony with a maximum sentence of eight years).
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The last actor with the power to nullify American criminal law is perhaps
the last one anyone suspects: the judge, the esteemed and venerated icon of the
rule of law.
C. JudicialNullification
American judges, collectively, have been vocally hostile toward jury
nullification for more than a century. They regularly deride the practice as lawless, sanction lawyers who advocate for nullification during trial, and refuse requests to instruct jurors that they have the power to return a verdict "in the teeth
of both law and facts." 2
Yet, judges are quite capable of nullification themselves, and they probably nullify the law quite often, consciously or not. The literature identifies at
least two ways that judges exercise their power of nullification: through the instructions they give to juries and in the sentences they give to convicted defendants.
For example, judges nullify the law when they give instructions to trial
53
juries. Their instructions are often so archaic or complex that they are effectively indecipherable to lay jurors, a practice Michael Saks calls "nullification by
non-instruction." 54 Judges do this, Saks says, for several reasons. First, judges
can exert control over juries through the quality of instructions they give them.
Where a judge believes the law would impede their own desired outcome, they
can give impossible instructions.55 If, on the other hand, the judge believes following the law will lead the jury to reach their preferred outcome, the instructions
given will be clearer.56 Second, judges nullify the law in order to reinforce the
adversarial process by deferring to lawyers' more comprehensible (but perhaps
less accurate) instructions given in closing arguments." Third, judges may give
unclear instructions to blunt "[u]njust laws or unjust applications." 8 This version
is most similar to traditional jury nullification. Fourth, counterintuitively, judges
may give unclear instructions in order to minimize legal complexity. 59 According
to Saks, "the more parsed and precise the law is, the more complex it becomes,
and the more incomprehensible to judges and lawyers." 60 This all sounds manipulative and dangerous to the rule of law, but Saks argues that it poses no threat
to the greater system. Despite constant calls for clearer jury instructions by

52

5

54
55
56

Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920).
Michael J. Saks, JudicialNullification, 68 IND. L.J. 1281, 1281 (1993).
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1290.
Id.

57

Id. at 1291-92.

58
59

Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1294.

60

Id.
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-

judges, lawyers, and laypeople alike, judicial nullification through non-instruction "usually has no great ill effects" because "most judges agree most of the
time with the jury's verdict."61
Sentencing a guilty defendant is the second opportunity for judicial nullification, according to Bruce Antkowiak. He argues that "[j]ust as a judge's certainty about the culpability of a defendant should inform the sentencing decision,
a judge's doubts about the correctness of the guilty verdict should be openly con62
sidered and weighed as a factor arguing for a diminished penalty." Juries often
make mistakes in criminal cases. After all, DNA testing has exonerated a great
number of convicted felons. 63 Antkowiak also notes that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is "more an exhortation than a legal standard," and in no way
64
guarantees that fallible human jurors will reach a factually accurate verdict.
"No system, no matter how well intended, can exist for long if it systematically calls upon persons to exercise discretion without cognizance of moral
issues or with disregard for matters of fundamental fairness," writes
Antkowiak. 65 Therefore, judges have a historical, moral, and practical obligation
to intervene when the jury makes mistakes or the legislature becomes too punitive. 66 Courts and professional organizations have long called on judges to make
67
Judges
sentencing decisions "appropriate to the offense and the offender."
would not be doing their duty if they did not take these obligations seriously
when sentencing the guilty, even if doing so feels like they are imposing their
will instead of the law. 68
These two forms of judicial nullification - instructions and sentencing
the judge's relationship with the jury, both before the verdict and after.
on
center
But what about the judicial role before a criminal case even begins? Judicial officers remain the great gatekeepers of lawful searches and arrests under the
Fourth Amendment. They grant or deny warrant applications submitted by law
enforcement. In this role, they may also exercise a nullifying prerogative. They

61

Id. at 1295.

62

Bruce A. Antkowiak, JudicialNuliufication, 38 CREIGHTON U. L. REv. 545, 547 (2005).

63

Id. at 556-57.

6

Id. at 565.

65

Id. at 567.

66

Id.

Id. at 579.
Sentence-nullifying trial judges should beware, however, that their rulings are subject to
68
appellate review. In United States v. Schrank, U.S. District Judge Sheryl Lipman defied federal
67

guidelines and sentenced a child pornography consumer to 12 months of home incarceration. 768
F. App'x 512, 514 (6th Cir. 2019). The Sixth Circuit reversed her and remanded for a new sentence.
Id. at 515. Judge Lipman then defied the Sixth Circuit, issuing the same sentence again. United

States v. Schrank, 975 F.3d 534, 535 (6th Cir. 2020). Unsurprisingly, the Sixth Circuit reversed
again-this time with stern language-and remanded the case to a different district judge. Id. at

535-36 (6th Cir. 2020).
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can choose to enable a heavily militarized and publicly polarizing law enforcement apparatus, or, by denying warrants wholesale, achieve alternative jurisprudential goals explored in Part V.
The next section describes the expansive power judges enjoy as warrant
issuers. Because they enjoy great immunity, wide discretion, and limited accountability, judges have extensive power to nullify law search warrants.
III.

JUDICIAL POWER TO NULLIFY WARRANTS

Power is the strongest where accountability is the weakest. Judges enjoy
great power to grant or deny warrant applications because they can be held accountable in only a few uncertain ways. Judges are immune from most suits, are
given wide discretion and great deference under both procedural rules and separation of powers principles, and enjoy incredible job security.
A.

Civil Immunity

The immunity extended to jurors makes jury nullification possible. "If
the members of a jury cannot themselves be charged with misfeasance when they
acquit someone who is clearly guilty, they obviously have the power to choose
to do so." 69 For prosecutors, a combination of discretion and immunity gives
them vast power to nullify as well. 70
Similarly, judges have both wide discretion and immunity from suit for
decisions they make in their judicial capacity.7 ' Judges enjoy absolute tort immunity for any acts done within their official jurisdiction.72 "A judge will not be
deprived of immunity because the action [they] took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of [their] authority; rather, [they] will be subject to
liability only when [they have] acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction."'7 3
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, "a judicial officer, in exercising the
authority vested in [them], [should] be free to act upon [their] own convictions,
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." 7 4

69

Robert T. Hall, Legal Tolerance of Civil Disobedience, 81 ETHICS 128,

70

See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991) (noting that prosecutorial immunity even ex-

135 (1971).

tends to "appearance in court in support of an application for a search warrant and the presentation
of evidence at that hearing").

11-12 (1991) (per curiam).

71

Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,

72

Judges are not fully immunized from criminalprosecution, however.
See Ex parte Virginia,

100 U.S. 339, 348-349 (1879).
73
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335,
351 (1871)).
74

Id. at 355. (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347).
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This principle applies to search warrant rejections in two ways. First,
nullifying warrants is an act (or refusal to act) out of "conviction," as the Supreme Court has put it.75 Second, there are no possible civil consequences for
exercising this conviction. If prosecutors are immune from civil suit for their role
76
in search warrant application hearings, certainly judges are as well. Also, this
immunity protects prosecutors and judges from suit by the people targeted by
search warrants, not by the people who execute them. Police officers are acting
as government agents, not individuals, and they would have no cause of action
for which to sue. There is simply no civil wrong or basis for standing. Rejecting
a search warrant application is not a justiciable harm that American tort law recognizes.
What about injunctions? The Supreme Court in Pulliam v. Allen held
that plaintiffs may seek injunctive relief from unconstitutional judicial orders under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, if successful, may win attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988.7" In Pulliam, a lower court enjoined a state magistrate from imposing
78
bail on suspects charged with non-jailable offenses. The imposition of bail violated the due process and equal protection rights of the suspects. 79 However,
rejecting a search warrant application interferes with no individual constitutional
right or interest. 80
Therefore, when it comes to the search warrant application process, judicial immunity is total, for practical reasons as well as doctrinal ones. Refusing
to issue a search warrant gives rise to no causes of action in tort, contract, or civil
rights, so a judge need not rely on common law principles of immunity at all to
avoid adverse legal consequences for nullification.
B. Discretionand Deference
The scope of judicial discretion is determined by the strength of review
to which it is subject. The more deferential the review, the greater the discretion.
How much discretion do judicial officers have when deciding whether to approve
a warrant application? 8 ' The answer depends on whether the judge is granting or
denying the warrant application. Judges who issue warrants enjoy great discretion. Judges who reject warrants may enjoy total discretion.

75

Id.

Burns, 500 U.S. at 492. The author could find no case challenging judicial immunity in this
76
context.
77

466 U.S. 522, 541-42, 544 (1984).

78

Id. at 524-25.

79

Id.

The police, as government actors, do not have a constitutional basis for suit under § 1983.
That law allows suits against them, not by them, unless they are suing as citizens whose rights have

80

been violated. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2021).

8'

"Discretion" in this context is the extent of deference warrant-issuing judges get in suppres-

sion hearings and appellate review.
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There are several reasons why. First, judicial officers are constrained by
specific federal and state rules of criminal procedure, but the rules only go so far.
Second, judicial officers may consider the "totality of the circumstances" when
determining probable cause, which gives them great latitude. Third, though the
standard of review in both suppression hearings and on appeal is highly deferential for warrant issuance, warrant rejection receives no review at all.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and all its state law counterparts include provisions on who should issue search warrants and how. The basic
process is as follows. A law enforcement officer submits a warrant application
to the judicial officer (sometimes called a "magistrate"). The application must
contain a sworn affidavit with information sufficient to establish probable cause
for the search, such as an informant's tip, first-hand observation by the officer,
physical evidence found elsewhere, etc. The application must also state where
the search will be conducted and who or what will be the subject of the search.
The judicial officer then reviews the application for probable cause and either
issues a warrant or rejects the application.
The wording of each jurisdiction's procedural rules varies, however. The
federal rules and the rules of some states use words like "must" or "shall" to
suggest that judicial officers are compelled to issue a warrant as long as the application establishes sufficient probable cause. On the other hand, the rules of
other states say that judges "may" issue warrants if sufficient grounds exist. Still,
other states offer only basic rules with no clear command to issuing judges one
way or the other. 82

82

For example, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(d)(1), "Obtaining a Warrant," states

that a magistrate judge "must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to search for and seize a
person or property." FED. R. GRIM. P. 41(d)(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, California Penal Code
section 1528 says that as long as a magistrate is "satisfied of the existence of the grounds of the
application" or if probable cause exists "to believe their existence," the magistrate "must issue a
search warrant." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1528 (West 2021). As another example, Colorado's rule is

nearly identical to California's rule. CoLO. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(l) (West 2021) ("If the judge is satisfied that grounds for the application exist, or that there is probable cause to believe that such
grounds exist, he shall issue a search warrant...") (emphasis added). Other states differ. Texas,
for instance, has warrant rules with more discretionary language. Texas's rules only use the word
"may." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02 (West 2021) ("(a) A search warrant may be issued
to search for and seize: (1) property acquired by theft or in any other manner which makes its

acquisition a penal offense; (2) property specially designed, made, or adapted for or commonly
used in the commission of an offense .... ") (emphasis added). The same goes for New York. N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. § 690.40(2) (McKinney 2021) ("If the court is satisfied [that the application requirements are met], it may grant the application and issue a search warrant directing a search of the

said place, premises, vehicle or person and a seizure of the described property or the described
person.") (emphasis added); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-21(a) (West 2021) ("Upon the written
complaint of any certified peace officer of this state . .. charged with the duty of enforcing the
criminal laws . .. under oath or affirmation . . . sufficient to show probable cause . .. any judicial
officer . . . may issue a search warrant for the seizure .... ") (emphasis added) (listed here as a
representative sample); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/108-3 (West 2021) ("[U]pon the written com-

plaint of any person under oath . .. which states facts sufficient to show probable cause and which
particularly describes the place or person, or both, to be searched and the things to be seized, any
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Regardless of the wording, no rule of criminal procedure strips a judicial
officer of their warrant-issuing discretion because all search warrants require
probable cause. Finding probable cause is the judge's job, and any decision they
make is subject to the gentlest review, if any. The Supreme Court noted in United
States v. Leon that because "[r]easonable minds frequently may differ on the
question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and . . . the
preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according 'great def83
erence' to a magistrate's determination."
The "fluid concept" of probable cause turns on "the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to
a neat set of legal rules." 84 Further, "probable cause does not demand the cer85
tainty we associate with formal trials." When ascertaining whether probable
cause exists, a judge must make "factual and practical considerations of everyday
86
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."
That does not mean that a judge's determination of probable cause and
approval of a search warrant are totally insulated from judicial review, however.
Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, a criminal defendant may challenge the constitutionality of a search warrant for lack of sufficient probable
cause and move to suppress evidence acquired with an invalid warrant.87
Reviewing courts assess whether probable cause existed to justify the
issuance of a particular warrant under a "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach
88
adopted by the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates. "[A]fter-the-fact scrutiny by
courts of the sufficiency of [probable cause] should not take the form of de novo
review." 89 To determine whether a search warrant was validly issued, a reviewing court may conduct "a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the

judge may issue a search warrant.") (emphasis added); OHio R. CRIM. P. 41(A)(l) (West 2021) ("A

search warrant authorized by this rule may be issued by a judge of a court of record to search and
seize property located within the court's territorial jurisdiction.") (emphasis added). Finally, other
states' rules follow a style more similar to the Fourth Amendment: a general statement of principle.
Pennsylvania's rules, for example, establish the basic conditions for warrant issuance without directly stating whether a warrant shall or may be issued should the conditions be met. PA. R. CuM.
P. 203(B) (West 2021) ("No search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by one
or more affidavits sworn to before the issuing authority in person or using advanced communica-

tion technology.").
468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984). The courts have left largely undefined precisely how a magistrate
8
makes that determination, though some judicial officers have gotten in trouble for overstepping

their investigative bounds and becoming "one-man grand juries." Abraham S. Goldstein, The
Search Warrant, the Magistrate, and Judicial Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1193 (1987).
84

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).

8

Id. at 246.

86

Id. at 231 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).

87
39.
"
89

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964), abrogated in part by Gates, 462 U.S. at 238462 U.S. at 230-34.
Id. at 236.
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various indicia of reliability (or unreliability)" in the application but should not
step into the shoes of the warrant-issuing judge to determine if probable cause
existed as a matter of law. 90 A reviewing court should merely decide whether
"the evidence viewed as a whole provided a 'substantial basis' for the Magistrate's finding of probable cause," not whether probable cause actually existed. 91
Some federal and state courts have taken this deference a step further.
Using a variety of approaches, these courts go so far as to sever parts of search
warrants that are too general or unsupported by probable cause from other parts
that are sufficiently based and particular. 92 This allows the use of some evidence
despite the suppression of other evidence from the same search. So even when
confronted with a warrant that has serious deficiencies, reviewing courts will still
give a partial pass to the police and the issuing judge, much to the detriment of
the criminal defendant who suffered an otherwise unconstitutional search. 93
In sum, judges who issue warrants are subject to highly deferential review that usually benefits law enforcement. Meanwhile, judges who reject applications for warrants have it even easier-they are subject to no review at all!
A search warrant must be issued before it can be challenged, and a search must
occur before there is a party with standing to challenge its lawfulness. A refusal
to issue a warrant simply does not create a justiciable issue at all. 94 While "[a]
warrant is not a judicial opinion," 95 a rejection of a warrant application is often
literally nothing whatsoever. 96 Often the only people who know about a warrant
rejection are the judge and the applying police officer, because the rejection occurs outside any case and before anyone becomes an actual defendant.
If a judge declines to issue a search warrant, there can be no subsequent
challenge to the judge's probable cause calculus because no party has suffered a

90

Id. at 234.

Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1984) (per curiam).
See, e.g., United States. v. Sells, 462 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cook, 657
F.2d 730 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981); United States v. Jacob, 657 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1981); Commonwealth v. Bagley, 596 A.2d 211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Aday v. Super. Ct. of Alameda Cnty.,
362 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1961).
93
For a thorough summary of how the Supreme Court's warrant review doctrine benefits issuing judges and law enforcement, see State v. Johnson, 56 A.3d 830, 845 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
91

92

2012) ("Reduce fifty years of rhetoric to a nutshell and what it says is that the reviewing judge
should approach the warrant with a smile.").
94
Goldstein, supra note 83, at 1179 ("[T]he pre-warrant review proceeding is very different
from the usual conception of a judicial hearing. It is ex parte in nature. The only 'witness' is the
police applicant who submits to the magistrate a written affidavit in support of his application.
There is no defendant, no defense counsel, no counsel representing the premises to be searched,
and no one to contest the allegations of the police-except the magistrate.").
95

United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 886 (7th Cir. 1984).

96
In Louisville, Kentucky, for example, "[t]he courts don't maintain a database of search warrant requests, and in turn, there's no record of search warrant requests that are rejected by a judge."
Jacob Ryan, Search Warrants Under Scrutiny as Police Killings Spark Reforms, WFPL (July 8,

2020), https://wfpl.org/search-warrants-under-scrutiny-as-police-killings-spark-reforms/.
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justiciable harm. If a judge rejects a search warrant application, but the police
conduct a search anyway, the defendant may challenge the search in criminal
court by seeking exclusion of any evidence found and in civil court by suing the
officers for civil rights violations. Either approach would scrutinize the actions
of the police, not the judge. In a suppression hearing or civil rights claim, the
police or prosecutor cannot argue that a warrantless search would have been lawful but for the judge's refusal to issue a warrant.
The police simply have no procedural method or cause of action to challenge the judge from their position as government agents. Even petitions for writs
of mandamus, sought to compel courts to act, are reserved for parties to existing
97
cases, not for law enforcement agents trying to build a case. Warrant rejections
are therefore effectively immune from challenge.
C. Job Security
There are methods for holding judges accountable for their actions other
than suppression hearings, appellate review, or civil liability. Judges can be voted
out of office, recalled, disqualified, impeached, or sanctioned by judicial disciplinary bodies. Can any of those methods curtail judicial power to nullify search
warrants? Probably not reliably.
The voting public can hold elected judges accountable. However, electoral accountability is not predictable or consistent. There is no rigid formula
where certain acts on the bench result in a loss at the ballot box next time around.
98
Judges who frequently misbehave are sometimes re-elected. Meanwhile, voters
can reject incumbent judges who have broken no rules. In 2010, three members
of the Iowa Supreme Court lost bitter re-election fights just one year after joining
99
the court's unanimous ruling legalizing same-sex marriage statewide. Whether
a judge is re-elected depends on many factors, from local connections and personal reputation, to general public support for their adjudicative record, or to
simple name recognition. As a method of accountability, elections are unreliable.
Eight states allow judicial recall elections, giving voters the chance to
00
remove judges from the bench before their regular terms have ended.1 The most

97

FED. R. App. P. 21(a)(1).

Matthew Glowicki, Louisville Judge Reprimanded over FacebookPost About Murder Dehttps://www.courier-jour2018),
13
(June
J.
COURtER
nal.com/story/news/crime/2018/06/13/louisville-judge-reprimanded-facebook-post-defendant/696189002/ ("It's the second such reprimand for the district court judge[] who.. .was elected
to the bench in 2010 and secured re-election in 2014... . McLaughlin was ranked lowest in general
satisfaction in 2014 and 2016 Louisville Bar Association evaluations of district court judges, as
voted by attorneys in Jefferson County.").
98

fendant,

A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 3, 2010),
99
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html.
100 Methods of Judicial Selection: Removal of Judges, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
http://www.judicialselection.com/judicialselection/methods/removal_ofjudges.cfn?state

visited Oct. 10, 2021).

(last
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recent judicial recall election was held in California in 2018, when Santa Clara
County Judge Aaron Persky was removed from the bench by voters after sentencing Brock Turner to merely six months in jail (of a possible fourteen years)
for conviction on three counts of sexual assault.101 Prior to Persky's recall, no
recall of a judge had even made it to a state ballot since 1982 in Wisconsin, and
no judge had been successfully recalled since 1977, also in Wisconsin.10 2 Thus,
recall, in the few places where it is available, has historically posed little judicial
accountability.
Appointed judges can be impeached. Federal judges, under Article III,
are subject to impeachment by the House and Senate.103 However, Congress has
impeached only 15 out of nearly 4,000 federal judges, convicting and removing
eight, the most recent in 2010.104
Most states allow impeachment for both appointed and elected judges,' 0 5
but these cases are also rare. Since 1994, only one state judge has been impeached and removed from office, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Rolf
Larsen.1 06 Failed attempts at impeachment have occurred more recently. For example, in 2018, the West Virginia House of Delegates voted to impeach every
justice on the state supreme court for wasteful spending and breaking payroll
rules.1 07 One justice retired, the state senate exonerated another, and the other
two dodged a vote when an acting version of the Supreme Court ruled that the
legislature broke its own rules in the impeachment process.' 08
Recall and impeachment are highly unlikely outcomes for any judge, regardless of whether they nullify search warrants. What about internal discipline

Aaron Persky Recall, Santa Clara County, California (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Aaron_Persky_recall,_Santa_ClaraCounty,_California_(2018) (last visited Oct. 10,
2021).
102
Joshua Spivak, California: PetitionersHand in 95,000 Signatures Against Santa Clara
Judge Aaron Persky; Likely to be First Recall of a Judge Since 1982, RECALL ELECTIONS BLOG
(Jan.
11, 2018), http://recalielections.blogspot.com/2018/01/california-petitioners-hand-in95000.html.
101

03
U.S. CONST. art. III; About Federal Judges, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judgesjudgeships/about-federal-judges (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
04 Impeachments of FederalJudges, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/impeachments-federal-judges (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
05 Methods of JudicialSelection: Removal of Judges, supra note 100.
106
Douglas Keith, Impeachment and Removal of Judges: An Explainer, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/impeachmentand-removal-judges-explainer.
07
All of West Virginia'sSupreme CourtJustices Impeached Over Spending, NBC NEWS (Aug.
14, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/all-west-virginia-s-supreme-courtjusticesimpeached-over-spending-n900461.
08 Brad McElhinny, With Resignation, Special Session to Impeach Loughry Is Off, WV

METRONEWS (Nov. 11, 2018, 4:09 PM), https://wvmetronews.com/2018/11/11/no-need-for-special-session-now-that-loughry-has-resigned-lawmakers-say/.
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by judicial commissions and appellate courts enforcing judicial codes of conduct?
In every jurisdiction, federal or state, judges must comply with codes of
conduct that regulate their temperament, impartiality, and obedience to the law.
Judges who violate these codes can be subject to disciplinary action by judicial
conduct commissions and superior courts. Violation of codes of judicial conduct
can result in reprimands, suspensions, and dismissal (whether a judge is elected
or appointed). Yet, no code may actually prohibit the blanket rejection of warrant
applications, and warrant rejection may not trigger any disciplinary review.
09
For example, the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, the Rules for
Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings,"o and the Code of Conduct for United States Judges govern the conduct of federal judges."' Each federal court of appeals circuit maintains its own judicial council, comprised of
judges from the circuit and its subordinate districts, that enforces the judicial
conduct rules." 2 State supreme courts or judicial commissions enforce similar
3
rules of judicial conduct against state judges." Most state judicial codes are
4
based on the ABA Model Rules." The rules, both federal and state, "are designed to inform judges on standards of behavior required to ensure that the pub5
lic has confidence in the judiciary's impartial administration of justice."" The
rules warn against impropriety and bias and require judges to recuse whenever
their personal relationships or pecuniary interests may become involved in a case

109
110

28 U.S.C.A. §§ 351-364 (West 2021).
Rulesfor Judicial-Conductand Judicial-DisabilityProceedings, U.S. CTs. (Mar. 12, 2019),

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judicial_conductand_disabilityrules_effec-

tive_march_12_2019.pdf.
Code of Conduct for United States Judges, U.S. CTs. (Mar. 12, 2019),
"11
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/codeof_conduct_for_unitedstates judgeseffec-

tive_march_12_2019.pdf.
Judicial Conduct & Disability, U.S. CTs., https://www.uscourts.gov/judgesjudgeships/ju112
dicial-conduct-disability (last visited Oct. 4, 2021). For a thorough description of the federal judicial disciplinary system, see John P. Sahl, Secret Discipline in the Federal Court-Democratic
Values and JudicialIntegrity at Stake, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 193, 207 (1994).
Joshua E. Kastenberg, Evaluating JudicialStandards of Conduct in the Current Political
and Social Climate: The Need to Strengthen Impropriety Standardsand Removal Remedies to Include ProceduralJustice and Community Harm, 82 ALB. L. REv. 1495, 1508-09 (2019). Kentucky, for example, has a Judicial Conduct Commission that is "the only entity authorized under
the Kentucky Constitution to take disciplinary action against a sitting Kentucky judge." Judicial
113

Conduct Commission,

Ky.

CTS. JUST., https://kycourts.gov/Courts/Pages/Judicial-Conduct-Com-

mission.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
114
See Model Code of Judicial Conduct, AM. BAR Ass'N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/publications/model_codeof-judicial-conduct/
(last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
115
Kastenberg, supra note 113, at 1511.

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

498

[Vol. 124

before them."6 The rules also demand faithfulness to the law, warning judges
not to be "swayed by ... public clamor."" 7
Judicial discipline is initiated by a complaint of some sort, filed by anyone who believes a judge has violated some rule of judicial conduct. The most
common complaints against federal judges are "abuse of judicial power," meaning "erroneous, delayed, or unsupported decisions," and "favoritism or bias" for
or against a litigant or attorney who appears before them." 8 Most federal complaints are dismissed, and very few federal judges are ever disciplined." 9
By contrast, state disciplinary committees and supreme courts remove
judges from office relatively often. From 1980 through 2019, approximately 450
state court judges were removed because of judicial disciplinary violations,
roughly 11 per year.1 2 0 Far more judges are scolded. In 2019 alone, 86 state
judges received some kind of lesser discipline for bad behavior, mostly for inappropriate comments and relationships.' 2' That said, the vast majority of judges
who face investigation and disciplinary action return to service.1 22

116
See CODE OF CONDUCT OF U.S. JUDGES Canons 2-3; MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canons
1.2 & 2.11 (AM. BAR ASs'N 2020). Impartiality is a constitutional rule, as well. Supreme Court
ruled in 1927 that criminal defendants have a "right to have an impartial judge." Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).
"7
CODE OF CONDUCT OF U.S. JUDGES Canon 3(A); see also MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT

Canon 2.4 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2020).
118

EMILY C. BARBOUR, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,

OVERVIEW 8 (201 1),
119
Id. at 9.

R41758,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41758.pdf.

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE PROCESS: AN

Nat'l Ctr. for State Cts., Removal Cases in 2019, 41 JUD. CONDUCT REP. 4, 4
(2020),
https://www.ncsc.org/_data/assets/pdf file/0022/15484/jcr-winter _2020.pdf.
121
Nat'l Ctr. for State Cts., State Judicial Discipline in 2019, 41 JUD. CONDUCT REP. 2, 2
(2020), https://www.ncsc.org/_data/assets/pdf file/0022/15484/jcrwinter _2020.pdf.
120

122

Michael Berens & John Shiffman, Thousands of U.S. Judges Who Broke Laws or Oaths
Remained on the Bench, REUTERS INVESTIGATES (June 30, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/inves-

tigates/special-report/usa-judges-misconduct/ ("Reuters identified and reviewed 1,509 cases . . . in
which judges resigned, retired or were publicly disciplined following accusations of misconduct.
In addition, reporters identified another 3,613 cases . . . in which states disciplined wayward judges
but kept hidden from the public key details of their offenses - including the identities of the judges
themselves. All told, 9 of every 10 judges were allowed to return to the bench after they were
sanctioned for misconduct.").
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123
Because the warrant application process is secret, and because in some
124
courts no records of rejected warrants are kept, it may be difficult to build a
record on which to base some form of accountability, be it electoral or discipli12
nary, for a warrant-nullifying judge. 1 It seems unlikely that voters would become aware of warrant rejections, that a legislative body would be motivated to
impeach over them, or that a disciplinary commission would have grounds to
punish for them.
Perhaps a local Fraternal Order of Police chapter could go public, accusing a judge of forestalling important police work by repeatedly rejecting warrants, potentially hurting them in the eyes of authoritarian voters. Alternatively,
a police officer could file a judicial disciplinary complaint against a judge who
rejected their search warrant application. On what grounds?
No judicial conduct rule specifically compels a judge to issue a search
warrant even if other judges, in their discretion, might find probable cause to
support it. 12 6 Judicial conduct rules do, however, demand impartiality and prohibit bias.127 Rules ofjudicial conduct require judges to recuse themselves if they

123

See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 3:5-4 (West 2021) (requiring all search warrants to be issued "with all
§ 29-817 (West 2021) (same); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.

practicable secrecy"); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 133.555(4) (West 2021) ("Until the warrant is executed, the proceedings upon application for a
search warrant shall be conducted with secrecy .... "); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.21 (West 2021)
(same); State v. Spriggs, 770 N.E.2d 638, 642 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Del. Cnty. 2000 ) ("An effective
search warrant process requires secrecy, confidentiality, and exclusion of the person or persons
under investigation.").
24
Jacob Ryan, Search Warrants Under Scrutiny as Police Killings Spark Reforms, KY. CTR.

FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (July 8, 2020), https://kycir.org/2020/07/08/search-warrants-under-scrutiny-as-police-killings-spark-reforms/ (noting that judges in Louisville, Kentucky, do not
keep records of rejected warrant applications). But see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.36(3) (requiring transcripts of oral search warrant applications to be filed with the court clerk regardless of
whether a warrant is ultimately issued).
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The author could find no federal or state rule of criminal procedure that requires judges to
explain their rejection of a warrant application in a formal opinion, written or otherwise.
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&

All codes of judicial conduct require a judge to "comply with," "uphold and apply," or otherwise be "faithful" to the law. See generally CODE OF CONDUCT OF U.S. JUDGES Canons 2(A)
3(A)(1); TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(2); DEL. JUDGES' CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon

3(A)(1); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 38(C), JUD. CODE OF CONDUCT Canons 1.1 & 2.2(A); MODEL RULES OF
JUD. CONDUCT Canons 1.1 & 2.2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2020). Primarily, this rule of compliance and/or
faithfulness has been enforced against judges who commit criminal offenses. Less often, the rule
has been used to punish judges who "disregard[] binding precedent or mandatory procedures for
conducting court proceedings," and almost never "for making erroneous legal rulings, absent improper motive, ill will, or malice." Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code ofJudicialConduct,

79 MARQ. L. REV. 949, 960-62 (1996). Some judges have been disciplined for "ignoring probable
cause requirements," but only when they unconstitutionally issued warrants that lacked probable
cause. Keith Swisher, The JudicialEthics of CriminalLaw Adjudication, 41 ARIz. STATE L.J. 755,

772-73 (2009).
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cannot be impartial or if they have a conflict of interest. 12 8 Arguably, a judge who
would refuse to issue warrants as a matter of conscience or principle would be
exhibiting personal bias, and thus should recuse. Recusal in this context, however, would have the same practical effect as rejecting the warrants: the police
would still be unable to get a warrant from that judge. Not that recusal is necessarily required to avoid discipline, at any rate, because refusing to step aside
would neither trigger appellate review (no case yet exists and no potentially biased judicial order has been issued) nor trigger disciplinary action for lack of
impartiality (no party to a case has received unfair treatment). Nevertheless,
when in doubt, recusal-as-nullification is an option.
Accordingly, judicial power to nullify search warrants is practically unchecked. Judges already enjoy vast immunity from civil suit but would not need
it when rejecting search warrants because no cause of action would arise. The
extensive discretion judges enjoy when assessing probable cause in warrant applications is subject only to highly deferential review, while the act of rejecting
a warrant is subject to no review at all because there must be a warrant for there
to be review. Finally, the various political modes of holding judges accountable
in their employment are mostly unreliable or rarely exercised. The only common
method of accountability, administrative discipline, turns on judicial codes of
conduct that would not, at least it seems to this author, effectively punish the
rejection of warrant applications, even as a matter of conscience.
So what is wrong with warrants, anyway? Part IV describes the vast toll
of search warrants, including deaths and injuries, civil disorder, and widespread
distrust of the police and the criminal justice system.
IV.

THE TOLL OF SEARCH WARRANTS

A search warrant is "the most drastic instrument which can be placed in
the hands of an officer." 129 A search warrant gives the full machinery of law
enforcement permission to enter a person's home. Police conduct raids with
heavily armed and armored teams, under cover of darkness, with little or no announcement before bashing in the door. These raids take a tremendous toll, killing and injuring suspects, bystanders, and officers who conduct them.
Police obtain warrants in different ways in different jurisdictions, but the
state courts of Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky offer a typical example of
the process. First, a police officer fills out the Kentucky Affidavit for a Search
Warrant form, identifying themselves and listing all factual allegations against

128

"Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, the probability of actual bias on the part
of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable." Rippo v. Baker, 137 S.
Ct. 905, 907 (2017) (internal quotations omitted). Due process demands "an absence of actual bias"
on the part of a judge. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). "Actual bias" is generally limited
to "direct, personal, substantial, [or] pecuniary interest[s]." Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556
U.S. 868, 876 (2009).
129
United States v. Palma, 295 F. 149, 152 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1924).
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the target of the search.130 The form is two pages long and has boxes for listing
the address of the premises to be searched, or the location of the vehicles or persons to be searched, as well as the specific property or contraband being searched
for.1 ' On the second page, the officer must add the basis for the search-either
personal observation or a tip-and describe the results of their own independent
investigation. 3 2 The officer must then swear to have "reasonable and probable
cause to believe . .. grounds exist for issuance of a Search Warrant" and sign
their name. The signature must also be notarized by a "Judge or Official author33
ized to administer oaths."1
Once the form is completed, the police officer submits it to a judge for
approval. Even though the trial courts in Jefferson County (District and Circuit)
designate one judge to be "on duty" every day, local practice is for police officers
34
When reviewing an
to contact "whoever is available" among 30 total judges.
application, judges are only supposed to consider the information on the Affidavit form and not base their decision on any separate conversation with the applying officer.'3 5 Not that it is possible to determine whether they do or not, however, because conversations between officers and judges during the application
36
process are not recorded in any way.'
If the judge approves the application, they issue a search warrant and put
a record of it on file "once a case begins crawling through the criminal justice
38
system."' 37 If the judge rejects an application, however, no record is kept.1 "The
39
courts don't maintain a database of search warrant requests."1

130 Affidavit for a Search Warrant, Ky. ADMIN. OFF. OF CTs., https://kycourts.gov/LegalForms/Legal%20Forms/335.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2021). Compare the Kentucky form to the
Federal Application for a Search Warrant, which is just one page long. It does allow law enforcement officers to attach additional pages for fact statements. Applicationfor a Search Warrant, U.S.
CTs., https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao106.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2021).
131

See Affidavit for a Search Warrant, supra note 124.
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Ryan, supra note 124.
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Id. Official policy for Louisville Metro Police Department officers is that they should seek

"an on-duty District or Circuit Court Judge" during regular court hours, not the on-duty judge. See
LOUISVILLE
OPERATING

METRO POLICE DEP'T, LOUISVILLE METRO POLICE DEPARTMENT STANDARD
https://www.louisville-police.org/Docu(2020),
8.1.11
§
PROCEDURES

mentCenter/View/615/Standard-Operating-Procedures-PDF. After hours, the SOP instructs officers to call the District Court Clerk's Office to connect with the on-call judge for that day.
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Ryan, supra note 124.
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Notably, the Affidavit form has no place to describe how the search warrant will be executed and police are not obligated to tell the judge. 4 0 With a
search warrant in hand, the police may now raid the home of a suspect with whatever tactical methods they determine to be most effective.141 Left entirely up to
the police are the number of executing officers, the types of weapons they will
carry, the time of day they will appear on site, and the level of force they will
deploy.
Across the country in recent years, increasingly militarized police 142
have killed and injured thousands of American citizens.1 43 Police frequently
serve search warrants by means of heavily armed and armored SWAT and other
tactical teams.' Other jurisdictions allow police in plain clothes to raid
homes.1 45 These "dynamic entry" teams (as they are known among police officers) execute search warrants using great force, battering rams, assault rifles, flash
bang grenades, and other dangerous weapons to distract, disorient, and subdue
anyone present on site.1 4 6 To achieve maximum surprise, police execute search
warrants at night and without warning. So-called "no-knock" searches (with warrants or without) are common after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that evidence
seized during searches that lacked appropriate warning would no longer be excluded from evidence.1 4 7

40
How to execute a search warrant is left to police discretion, which is wide. "[T]he Fourth
Amendment does not require officers to use the best technique available as long as their method is
reasonable under the circumstances." Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1996)
(citing Collins v. Nagle, 892 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1989)).
141
Subject to the limitations on the warrant itself: what property may be seized, what places
must be searched, etc.

142

See Peter B. Kraska, Militarizationand Policing-Its Relevance to 21st Century Police, 1

POLICING: J. POL'Y & PRAC. 501 (2007).
143

See

Fatal

Force,

WASH.

POST

(Sept.

30,

2021),

https://www.washing-

tonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/.
44
UTAH COMM'N ON CRIM. AND JUV. JUST., 2014 LAW ENFORCEMENT TRANSPARENCY ANNUAL
REPORT (2014), http://Iibertasutah.org/drop/sbl85_2014.pdf (recording 559 incidents of SWAT or
tactical team deployment, 96% of which served search warrants, 83% of which were for drug
crimes); Radley Balko, 4.5 SWAT Raids Per Day, REASON (Mar. 1, 2010, 4:30 PM), https://reason.com/20l0/03/01/45-swat-raids-per-day/ (94% of the 804 SWAT team deployments in Mary-

land during six month period of 2009 were for warrant service); Hannah Grabenstein, 2014 Little
Rock Police Memo: SWAT Team Served All Warrants, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://apnews.com/article/f60085790b2d491 eae75108e20bd I68c.

145

See Christina Carrega & Sabina Ghebremedhin, Timeline: Inside the Investigation ofBre-

onna Taylor's Killing and Its Aftermath, ABC NEWS

(Nov.

17, 2020,

2:31

PM),

https://abcnews.go.com/US/timeline-inside-investigation-breonna-taylors-killing-

aftermath/story?id=71217247.
Glenn French, Dynamic Entry Versus Deliberate Entry,
POLICE] (Aug. 3, 2010),
https://www.police l .com/swat/articles/dynamic-entry-versus-deliberate-entry46

s86BB28VVWLfwJXW/.
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Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
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The use of violent, "dynamic entry" teams to execute search warrants
has been common over the past decade. Between 2010 and 2014, 90% of the
8,249 SWAT deployments by police in Maryland were to serve search warrants.1 48 In Little Rock, Arkansas, SWAT teams demolished doors and used
flash-bang grenades in 90% of all search warrant raids between 2011 and 2013.149
In 2015, the website Vox estimated that police were conducting 20,000 "noknock" raids nationwide per year, usually while executing search warrants for
drugs.15 0 However, despite all that effort, many raids come up empty-handed.
According to a study of 818 SWAT deployments nationwide, 294 drug raids
(36%) found no evidence of drugs.15 ' Much worse is the record of the Chicago
Police Department, which conducted 4,921 drug-related search warrants from
2016 to 2019, but confiscated drugs in only 221 cases (less than 5%).152
Police now routinely execute search warrants in ways that are inherently
dangerous to officers, as the police themselves acknowledge. Surprise home
searches sometimes spark violent resistance from the residents. Commenting on
a late-night raid during which four officers were wounded before killing two drug
suspects, Houston Police Chief Art Acevedo described the situation at the raided
home as a "fatal funnel" where the police attempted to enter through the narrow
front door while under fire.' 5 3 "The tactical advantage really is in the hands of
the suspect," Acevedo admitted, without explaining why officers would knowingly create and rush into a highly dangerous situation when other options for
serving warrants are available. 154
Ultimately, the body count is high no matter how search warrants are
served, whether by SWAT teams or otherwise. From 2010 through 2016, at least
81 civilians and 13 officers died during SWAT raids, including 31 civilians and
55
In approximately
eight officers during the execution of no-knock warrants.

148
Kevin Sack, Door-BustingDrug Raids Leave a Trail of Blood, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/18/us/forced-entry-warrant-drug-raid.html.
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Id.

Dara Lind, Cops Do 20,000 No-Knock Raids a Year. Civilians Often Pay the Price When
Wrong, Vox (May 15, 2015), https://www.vox.com/2014/10/29/7083371/swat-noGo
They
1s

knock-raids-police-killed-civiians-dangerous-work-drugs.
151
ACLU, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION

OF AMERICAN POLCING 34

"

(2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-warcomeshome-report-web-rell.pdf.
152
Dave Savini, Samah Assad, & Michele Youngerman, "They Had the Guns PointedAt Me;
Another Chicago Family Wrongly Raided, Just I Month After Police Created Policy to Stop Bad
Raids, CBS CHI., https://chicago.cbslocal.com/they-had-the-guns-pointed-at-me-another-chicago(last visited
family-wrongly-raided-just-l-month-after-police-created-policy-to-stop-bad-raids/

Oc. 10, 2021).
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Juan A. Lozano, Serving Warrants Is Inherently Dangerous, Experts Say, ASSOCIATED

PRESS (Jan. 29, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/north-america-fires-tx-state-wire-us-news-ap-

top-news-30fd23e66f21446b90d2b8cb0135ae03.
Id. The article notes that the National Tactical Officers Association is now advising depart154
ments to avoid "dynamic entries" due to their dangerousness. Id.
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Sack, supra note 148.
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500 drug-related SWAT raids between 2011 and 2012, police killed seven people
and injured 46.156 By another estimate, 73 police officers (SWAT and nonSWAT) were killed nationwide serving warrants between 2009 and 2019.15' Researcher Radley Balko estimates that late-night police drug raids (SWATexecuted or otherwise) kill 30-40 people per year, eight to ten of which are "completely innocent" persons.1 58 In total, police in the United States have killed approximately 1,000 people annually from 2015 to 2020, many in drug-related
searches.1 59 Of the roughly 6,000 people killed, 250 were women, including 48
black women.' 60 The total number of people killed and injured during police
raids since the drug war began in 1971 is unknown but is likely in the five figures.
Police raiding people's homes in the middle of the night without warning
is dangerous for two reasons. First, police make serious mistakes and execute the
raids dangerously. As just one example, an in-depth New York Times investigation exposed how Louisville Metro Police violently botched a late-night raid of
the home of Breonna Taylor, shooting more than 30 bullets in all directions.1 6
The police killed Taylor and her death sparked a months-long protest movement.1 62

Second, Americans are incredibly well-armed. According to one study,
there are nearly 400 million privately owned firearms in the United States, more
than one gun per person.' 63 In 2017, Gallup estimated that nearly half of American households own at least one gun. '" Handguns are in such "common use" as
home-defense weapons that they now enjoy constitutional protection-partially on
that basis.1 65 And, despite already leading the world in private gun ownership by

156

157
58

ACLU, supra note 151.
Lozano, supra note 153.
See No-Knock Warrants: How Common They Are and Why Police Are Using Them, NPR

(June 12, 2020, 4:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/12/876293168/no-knock-warrants-howcommon-they-are-and-why-police-are-using-them.
159 FatalForce, supra note 143.
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Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/us/breonna-taylorgrand-jury-black-women.html.
161
Malachy Browne, Anjali Singhvi, Natalie Reneau, & Drew Jordan, How the Police Killed
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TIMES
(Dec.
28,
2020),
times.com/video/us/i 00000007348445/breonna-taylor-death-cops.html.
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Christopher Ingraham, There Are More Guns Than People in the United States, According
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U.S. 570 (2008).
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far, Americans keep buying new guns. In 2018 alone, Americans bought an es166
Police come
timated 12.6 million guns through federally licensed dealers.
heavily armed because suspects are heavily armed. This "tragic conflict inherent
in the U.S. legal system" regularly pits militarized police against lawfully armed
67
suspects and bystanders, with deadly results.1
Many search warrants in the United States are issued as part of the ongoing "war on drugs" being waged both by the federal government and a decreasing number of states. If public use and perception of drugs are benchmarks
for success, however, drug prohibition has been a dismal failure. The use of drugs
seems to be on the rise. Between 1992 and 2014, the number of Americans selfreporting illegal drug use increased from 6% to just over 10%.168 According to
the CDC, that number rose to 11.7% by 2018.169
Meanwhile, public support for the drug war is dropping dramatically.
According to the Pew Research Center, 54% of Americans supported legalization of marijuana, and 76% opposed jail time as punishment for possession of
small amounts in 2014.170 By 2019, the number of Americans supporting full
17 1
marijuana legalization had risen to 67%, with only 8% still favoring a total ban.
In early 2020, 11 states and the District of Columbia had legalized recreational
172
use while 26 additional states had legalized it for medicinal use. After the elec-
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Ann Schmidt, These States Sell the Most Guns in the US, Fox Bus. (Nov. 6, 2019),
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20
18/03/more-imprisonmenthttps://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/
does-not-reduce-state-drug-problems.
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Illicit Drug Use, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/drug-use-

illicit.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
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CTR. (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/14/americans-support-marijuana-legalization/.
172
John Gramlich, Four-in-Ten U.S. Drug Arrests in 2018 Were for Marijuana Offenses
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tions in November of that year, the number of states that had fully legalized marijuana use increased to 15.173 Oregon has gone so far as to decriminalize all
drugs, reducing possession of heroin and cocaine to mere violations.1 4
Gradually decreasing support for the drug war has not stopped police
efforts to crack down on drugs, however. In 2018, police officers still made
nearly 700,000 arrests for marijuana-related offenses out of 1.65 million total
drug busts.17 5 In the city of Chicago alone, police conducted nearly 5,000 drugrelated searches between 2016 and 2019.176
In just the past four years, public perception of police use of force has
significantly worsened. In 2016, 45% of Americans felt that police around the
country were doing a "good" or "excellent" job at "using the right amount of
force for each situation.1 7 7 By 2020, that number dropped to 35%.178 Also between 2016 and 2020, confidence in the police "holding officers accountable
when misconduct occurs" dropped from 44% positive to 31% positive.7 9 Moreover, while only 31% of police officers view the deaths of black people during
encounters with police as "signs of a broader problem," nearly 60% of the public
view them this way.1 80 These worsening opinions of police tactics are fueling a
growing movement to restrict search warrants in general.' 8
On the other side of the battering ram, more than half of police officers
across the country report frequently feeling angry, frustrated, or both, on the
job. 8 2 Nearly a quarter of officers report feeling angry and frustrated, and of

173
Map of State MarijuanaLaws, MARIJUANA POL'Y PROJECT, https://www.mpp.org/issues/legalization/map-of-state-marijuana-laws/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
174
Allen Kim, Oregon Becomes the FirstState to DecriminalizeSmall Amounts of Heroin
and

Other Street Drugs, CNN (Nov. 9, 2020, 8:13 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/1 1/09/politics/oregon-decriminalize-drugs-trnd/index.html.
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those, many favor "an aggressive rather than courteous approach" in some parts
of their city (77%) and "hard, physical tactics. .. [for] some people" (56%).183
In sum, militarized police execute thousands of search warrants per year,
many in pursuit of drugs, resulting in hundreds of deaths and an unknown number of serious injuries. Many raids find no drugs. Meanwhile, public use of drugs
is up, public support for drug bans is down, and there is decreasing trust in police
use of force. Police, for their part, are angry and frustrated. These are the practical
consequences of the "rule of law" in America today.
The next section, Part V, explains how this state of affairs justifies a
radical response from judges on three pragmatic grounds.
V.

PRAGMATIC JUSTIFICATIONS

This Article offers three pragmatic justifications for search warrant nullification. The first is judicial independence from law enforcement. The second
is harm reduction, both physical and constitutional. The third is community stability, i.e., reducing social upheaval and promoting social harmony.
A.

JudicialIndependencefrom Law Enforcement

The first pragmatic justification for search warrant nullification is judicial independence from law enforcement. The judicial branch has a duty to restrain executive power, not to enable it. The Supreme Court once astutely
warned:
The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the
discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the
arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows
that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted. And so the
Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the
police before they violate the privacy of the home.14
For this reason, the Court ruled that only a "neutral and detached" magistrate who does "not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police" should issue
a search warrant.1 85 A search warrant should be "a more reliable safeguard
against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer
186
Further'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."'
more, a judge who fails to "manifest that neutrality and detachment demanded
of a judicial officer when presented with a warrant application and who acts instead as an adjunct law enforcement officer cannot provide valid authorization"

183

Id.

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
185
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111
(1964), abrogatedin part by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)).
186
Id.
184
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for a search.' 8 7 A warrant approval "cannot be a mere ratification of the bare
conclusions" of police.' 8 8
The police do not work alone. Law enforcement often involves a close
partnership between police officers and prosecutors, who are the most powerful
actors in American criminal justice. This partnership takes many forms, from
joint lobbying efforts in the guise of police unions and prosecutor associations,
to personal friendships and romantic relationships.1 89 Police and prosecutors
wield tremendous power on their own, but together they are especially potent.
Thus, for judges, adhering to the Supreme Court's command to be a check on the
headiness of executive power becomes all the more important.
In reality, American judges seem to have enthusiastically embraced the
forbidden role as "adjunct law enforcement" over the past several decades. Four
examples follow: a pro-police judicial doctrine, over-representation of prosecutors on the federal bench, emphasis on "law and order" in state judicial elections,
and evidence that many judges approve search warrants with little more than a
cursory review.
Judges function as de facto law enforcement by protecting police officers
from civil liability. The judicially-created doctrine of qualified immunity regularly shields police officers from civil liability for excessively violent or outright
criminal behavior if that behavior was not "clearly established" to be unconstitutional in a prior case.1 90 Consider several recent examples. First, the Eleventh
Circuit admitted that police violated the Fourth Amendment when they blindly
threw a flash bang grenade onto the bed of a sleeping suspect, but granted qualified immunity anyway, even though that precise violation had been "clearly established" in other circuits.19' Second, the Eighth Circuit granted immunity to an
officer who body-slammed a small woman unconscious and broke her collarbone
because they could find no prior case that "involved a suspect who ignored an
officer's command and walked away." 92 Third, the Ninth Circuit granted immunity to police officers whose theft of $225,000 from a suspect was "morally
wrong" and "deeply disturbing" but was not a clear violation of the Fourth
Amendment because no prior case had so held.'
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Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lo-Ji. Sales, Inc. v. New
York, 442 U.S. 319,

325 (1979)).
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Id. at 915.
189
Maybell Romero, Prosecutors and Police: An Unholy Union, 54 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1097,
1103-14 (2020).
1% See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, How QualifiedImmunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2 (2017).
191 Dukes v. Deaton, 852 F.3d 1035, 1043 (11th Cir. 2017). In more recent case, the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that a police officer's "action of intentionally firing at [a passive] dog and unintentionally shooting [a ten-year-old child] did not violate any clearly established Fourth Amendment
rights." Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1315 (11th Cir. 2019).
192
Kelsay v. Ernst, 933 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
193 Jessop v. City of Fresno, 936 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2019).
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Another example of judicial entanglement with law enforcement is the
fact that many judges spent their pre-bench legal careers as law enforcement.
Former prosecutors are overrepresented on the federal bench compared to other
attorneys. 194 A 2019 survey of 755 non-senior federal district and circuit judges
195
found nearly 40% of them were former state or federal prosecutors.
State electoral politics is a third example of judicial entanglement with
law enforcement. State judicial candidates across the country routinely run on
campaign platforms more appropriate for sheriffs and prosecutors, boasting that
96
they will "support law enforcement" and be "tough on crime."' They frequently
19 7
attack their electoral opponents as "too lenient" and "soft on crime." As just
one recent example, a 2020 candidate for state trial court in Kentucky boasted on
his campaign Facebook page that his "goal is to fight crime harder" and used the
98
slogan "Protecting Family. Fighting Crime. Always!"' Not to be outdone, his
opponent heavily touted her four-year career as a prosecutor even though she
99
quit in 2008 and spent the next 12 years in private family law practice.1 The
2 00
war-on-drugs judge won.
Once in office, rubber-stamping warrant applications becomes standard
operating procedure for judges all over the country. As just one example, a public
records request revealed that state judges in Utah took an average of eight

194 Clark Neily, Are a DisproportionateNumber of FederalJudges Former GovernmentAdvocates?, CATO INST. (May 27, 2021), https://www.cato.org/publications/studies/are-disproportionate-number-federal-judges-former-government-advocates.
195
Id. Prosecutors make up a small percentage of total active attorneys in the United States.
According to the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, there were 34,288 attorneys working in state prosecutors' offices in 2007. STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS,
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007-STATISTICAL TABLES (2011). Around the same time, there
were approximately 5,800 federal prosecutors. Daniel Richman, PoliticalControl ofFederalProsecutions: Looking Back and Looking Forward,58 DUKE L.J. 2087, 2088 (2009). Those approximately 40,000 state and federal prosecutors were only 3.5% of the 1,143,000 active attorneys in
the U.S. in 2007. ABA NationalLawyer Population Survey, 1878-2020, AM. BAR ASs'N (2007),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/marketresearch/total-national-

lawyer-population-1878-2020.pdf.
196

Keith Swisher, Pro-ProsecutionJudges: "Tough on Crime," Soft on Strategy, Ripefor Dis-

qualification,52 ARiz. L. REv. 317, 328-31 (2010).
197
d. at 331.
198

Judge

Barber

FACEBOOK (July 16, 2020), https://www.faceBarber for Circuit Judge, FACEBOOK (Aug. 24,
Judge
book.com/JudgeBarberForCircuitJudge/;
2020), https://www.facebook.com/JudgeBarberForCircuitJudge/. This rhetoric, as well as punitive
behavior by judges, is a symptom ofjudicial elections. According to the Brennan Center for Justice,
"the pressures of upcoming re-election and retention election campaigns make judges more punitive toward defendants in criminal cases." See KATE BERRY, How JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IMPACT
CRIMINAL CASES

199

for

Circuit

Judge,

1 (2015).

Elizabeth Davis, Elizabeth Davis for Circuit Judge, ELIZABETH DAVIS FOR CIR. JUDGE,

https://davisforjudge.com/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
200
CircuitJudge, 21st JudicialCircuit, 2nd Division, KY. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS (Nov. 10,
2020, 9:51 AM), https://results.enr.clarityelections.com/KY/I 06379/web.264614/#/detail/6700.

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

510

[Vol. 124

minutes to approve nearly 9,400 warrants during a one-year period beginning in
early 2017.201 Judges approved more than half of all warrants in less than three
minutes, and approved nearly 300 warrants in less than 30 seconds. 202 Between
2016 and 2018, these judges rejected only 2% of all search warrant applications.2o3

In the much-publicized case of Breonna Taylor, killed by Louisville
Metro Police officers in a botched home search in March 2020, a Kentucky trial
court judge allegedly approved five no-knock search warrants within 12 minutes,
including one for Taylor's apartment. 204 On Taylor's warrant, the judge's signature was legible, unlike the signatures on more than two-thirds of the 231 search
warrants approved in Louisville between January 2019 and September 2020.205
On those, it was impossible to tell which judge signed it.
Some judges do not bother reviewing warrants at all. In Georgia, a
county magistrate judge was caught pre-signing blank warrant forms and distributing them to police officers. 206 Kentucky judges have engaged in similar behavior, pre-signing blank search warrants and child removal orders. 207
This routine approval of search warrants, often without legitimate scrutiny and without any subsequent accountability, is even worse because police
201
Data: Most Utah Warrants Approved in Less Than 3 Minutes, 2KUTV
(July 16, 2018),
https://kutv.com/news/local/data-most-utah-warrants-approved-in-less-than-3 -minutes.
202
203

Id.
Id.

204
Tessa Duvall & Ben Tobin, Louisville Detective Who Obtained No-Knock Warrantfor Breonna Taylor's Apartment Reassigned, USA TODAY (June 16, 2020, 2:48 PM) https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/06/16/breonna-taylor-louisville-detective-joshua-jaynes-noknock-warrant-reassigned/3200277001/. After several months of protest and civil unrest in re-

sponse to Taylor's killing, the judge admitted she was "concerned" that the warrants she signed
were based on false or misleading information provided by the police. See Andrew Wolfson, Darcy
Costello, & Tessa Duvall, Judge Says She Is "Concerned" Detective May Have Lied to Get Breonna Taylor Search Warrant, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Oct. 1, 2020, 5:18 PM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/breonna-taylor/2020/10/01/breonna-taylor-case-judge-concerned-lmpd-cop-lied-get-warrant/5883362002/. But see Charles Cunningham, Judge in Breonna
Taylor Case Didn 't Rubber-Stamp Search Warrants, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (July 1, 2020, 10:51
AM), https://www.courier-joumal.com/story/opinion/2020/07/01/breonna-taylor-police-shootingjudges-dont-rubber-stamp-warrants/3285195001/ (fellow Jefferson County judge disputing "12
minutes" claim).
205
Jacob Ryan & Travis Ragsdale, Which Louisville Judge Let Police Raid Your House? Most
SignaturesAre Unreadable, WDRB NEWS (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.wdrb.com/in-depth/which-

louisville-judge-let-police-raid-your-house-most-signatures-are-unreadable/articlec3a2e852f7c5-1 lea-9ac7-9b9787616be3.html.
206
Molly McDonough, Accused of ProvidingBlank Arrest Warrants to Police, Georgia Magistrate Resigns,

ABA

J.

(Aug.

20,

2012),

https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ac-

cused_of providingblankarrest_warrants_to_police-georgiamagistrate.
207
Jason Riley, Kentucky Workers Accused of Illegally Removing Children

from Homes,

WDRB NEWS (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.wdrb.com/in-depth/sunday-edition-kentucky-work-

ers-accused-of-illegally-removing-children-from/article_5b42179c-474f-1
5b 1688808fe4.html.
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officers often lie to obtain them. 208 Even though the Supreme Court has long held
209
that false statements on warrant affidavits are grounds for suppression, police
make false statements anyway, part of a general practice frequently called "testilying." 21 0 Consider several examples from just the past three years. In 2018, a
police detective in Minnesota was fired (and 32 cases he worked on were dis21
missed) for submitting a falsified search warrant application. ' After a drug raid
that killed two residents and injured four officers in 2019, the Houston Police
Department admitted that the affidavit used to get the search warrant contained
212
"material untruths and lies" concocted by the investigating officer. Six officers
involved in that raid were later indicted, including the officer who lied to get the
213
warrant, and 160 other drug convictions he helped obtain were dismissed. In
July 2020, two Chicago Police Department gang unit officers were sentenced
following a 2019 conviction for falsely obtaining search warrants "to search
1
Finally, in Auproperties and seize cash and drugs" from unwitting victims.
police officer
Jersey
New
gust 2020, a federal judge concluded that a Trenton,

Not that it necessarily matters for suppression purposes. The U.S. Supreme Court has held
208
that if a defendant can prove that an officer made a "false statement knowingly and intentionally,
or with reckless disregard of the truth" in a search warrant application, the defendant can move for
a hearing to determine whether that statement was necessary to the magistrate's finding of probable
cause. If it was, the warrant would be invalid and the evidence suppressed. If the reviewing court
determines that probable cause could be found without the false statement, then the evidence

should not be suppressed. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). The defendant thus
has two difficult challenges: rebutting the good faith presumption by proving the false statement
was intentional or reckless, and proving the statement was the dispositive basis for probable cause.
209
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).
210
See Morgan Cloud, Judges, "Testilying," and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1341,
1346 (1996); Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1312 (1994); Christo-

pher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1037,

1043 (1996).
211
Police Officer Lied on Search Warrant, Cases Being Dismissed, HENNEPIN CNTY. ATT'Y,
20
(last
18/October/EdenPrairie-cases-dismissed
https://www.hennepinattomey.org/news/news/
visited Oct. 11, 2021). An arbitrator later ordered the department to re-hire him. Joe Augustine,
Police Officer Firedfor Falsifying Search Warrant Will Get Job Back, KSTP 5 EYEWITNEsS NEWS

(Mar. 16, 2020, 8:46 PM), https://kstp.com/news/police-officer-who-allegedly-falsified-searchwarrant-will-get-job-back/5676056/.
212
Phil Helsel & Tom Winter, Houston Officer Apparently Lied in Seeking WarrantBefore

Raid That Left 2 Dead,

Chief Says, NBC

NEwS (Feb.

16,

2019,

12:43

AM),

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/houston-officer-apparently-lied-seeking-warrant-raid-

left-2-dead-n972191.
213

Juan A. Lozano, Ex-Houston Officers Indicted in Wake of Deadly DrugRaid, 5 NBC DFW

(July 31, 2020, 2:14 PM), https://www.nbcdfw.com/newslocal/texas-news/ex-houston-officers-

indicted-in-wake-of-deadly-drug-raid/2417831/.
Corrupt Chicago Police Officer David Salgado Sentenced to Nearly 6 Years for Scheme to
Get Bogus Warrants to Steal Cash, Drugs, CBS 2 CHI. (July 15, 2020, 4:54 PM), https://chi214

cago.cbslocal.com/2020/07/ 15/corrupt-chicago-police-officer-david-salgado-sentenced-to-nearly6-years-for-scheme-to-get-bogus-warrants-to-steal-cash-drugs/.
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engaged in "affirmative acts of deliberate deception" to obtain a search warrant
in a case against 27 drug defendants. 21 5
This is just a shortlist of officers who were actually caught lying and
were subjected to internal discipline, if not perjury charges. 216 Many lie without
consequence. 2 17

Judges are not police officers. Judges are "law enforcement" only in that
they referee the adversarial system of criminal justice to ensure due process for
the accused. Yet many judges act otherwise, as "tough on crime" enablers of
militarized and aggressive police officers. Re-establishing judicial independence
would be one justification for warrant nullification.
B. Physical and ConstitutionalHarm Reduction
The second pragmatic justification for search warrant nullification is
harm reduction. Judges have tremendous power to protect some of the most intimate and important regions of human life by nullifying home search warrants.218 Searches of the home still require a warrant in nearly all situations; thus,
judges who reject applications for such searches can mitigate the risks of physical
and constitutional harm inflicted by over-aggressive police officers.
Home raids are physically dangerous. Aggressive, "dynamic entry"
searches of a person's home are increasingly common and especially injurious
to both the residents and the officers conducting the searches for reasons explained above in Part IV. Americans own millions of guns and have a constitutionally protected right to defend their homes with them. 2 19 Guns aside, late-night
raids on homes cause surprise, panic, and death, even when residents do not fight
back. Judges who reject search warrant applications can mitigate these risks by
preventing the police from conducting the raids.
Home raids are also constitutionallydangerous, because "physical entry
of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment

215
Isaac Avilucea, Trenton Cop Facing Dismissalfor Lying on Search Warrant in Federal
Drug Case, TRENTONIAN (Aug. 19, 2020, 12:55 PM), https://www.trentonian.com/news/trenton-

cop-facing-dismissal-for-lying-on-search-warrant-in-federal-drug-case/article_095ae374-dacd-

11 ea-8850-2fccc3e64879.html.
216

Going back further in time reveals other serious incidents, such as when the testimony of
five veteran Chicago police officers was revealed to be false by surprise video evidence during a
trial. See Steve Schmadeke, 5 Cops Caught in Lies on Witness Stand, Judge Says, CHI. TRIB. (Apr.
15, 2014), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/glenview/ct-xpm-2014-04-15-ct-police-testi-

mony-lies-met-20140415-story.html.
217
Joseph Goldstein, Testilying by Police: A Stubborn Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/nyregion/testilying-police-perjury-new-york.html.
218
See generally George C. Thomas III, The Common Law Endures in the Fourth
Amendment,
27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 85, 111 (2018).
219
See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of Columbia v.

Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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is directed." 2 20 It is the fundamental principle of the Fourth Amendment that "a
man's house [is] his castle," shielded from unreasonable intrusion by government agents.22
This "castle doctrine" is so fundamental to American law that it has been
enshrined in many places beyond the federal constitution, such as in state selfdefense statutes that shield homeowners from criminal and civil liability for inflicting harm upon intruders. 22 2 Some states have laws allowing deadly force
against home-intruding outsiders as long as there is a reasonable belief that
223
deadly force is necessary to repel them. Other state laws presume that someone
using deadly force to repel home intrusion had a reasonable belief that such force
224
was necessary (even if they did not reasonably believe force was necessary).
Kentucky extends this presumption to police raids, shielding those who use force
to repel police officers from their homes if the officers failed to identify them225
selves before entering and the resident did not otherwise know who they were.
Meanwhile, Indiana extends the castle doctrine to allow violence against police
226
officers who enter a home unlawfully, announced or not. Regardless of their
specific construction, state castle doctrine statutes place "the intruder beyond the
227
-someprotection of the law and suspend the state monopoly on violence"
times even when the intruder is the state itself.
Government intrusion poses a profound threat to the sanctity of a person's home. For that reason, courts have strictly enforced the Fourth Amend228
Rejecting applications for
ment's warrant requirement for home searches.

220
221

United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v.

Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), andoverruled in part on other grounds by Elkins v. United States, 364

U.S. 206 (1960).
222
See Castle Doctrine States 2021, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-rankings/castle-doctrine-states (last visited Sept. 25, 2021).
223
See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-2 (West 2021); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, §

8A (West 2021).
224

See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE

§

198.5 (West 2021); FLA. STAT. ANN.

§

776.013(2) (West

2021).
225
226

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.055(2)(d) (West 2021).
Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2(i) (West 2021) ("A person is justified in using rea-

sonable force against a public servant" to protect from the servant's use of "unlawful force," to
"prevent or terminate the public servant's unlawful entry," or "unlawful trespass" on property),

with 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b) (West 2021) ("The use of force is not justifiable . .. to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the
arrest is unlawful.").
227
Benjamin Levin, Note, A Defensible Defense?: Reexamining Castle Doctrine Statutes, 47
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 523, 531 (2010) (quoting JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION iS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 59 (2009)).
228

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 573 (1980) (establishing that "an invasion of the sanctity

of the home, which is too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant" and "the Fourth
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home searches thus is a powerful form of nullification because warrantless home
searches are "presumptively unreasonable." 229 In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court declared "the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable intrusion" to be at "the very core" of the Fourth
Amendment. 23 0 A warrantless search of a home is unreasonable and hence unconstitutional except in very few situations. 23 1 Without a warrant or a recognized
exigency, "any physical invasion of the structure of the home, by even a fraction
of an inch, [is] too much." 23 2 Federal law even criminalizes warrantless searches
of "private dwellings" by officers, agents, and employees of the United States. 233
In other words, without a warrant, police cannot "reasonably" search a
home in most cases. Courts can suppress evidence found in warrantless home
searches under the "exclusionary rule." 234 Qualified immunity would rarely
shield officers who knowingly conduct warrantless home searches because the
right to be secure from unreasonable government intrusion into the home has
long been "clearly established." 2 5 Thus, warrant nullification can create a powerful deterrent to home invasions by police because raids would not produce usable evidence and would subject officers to greater liability. Fewer raids necessarily mean fewer people injured and killed in them.
C. Community Stability
The third pragmatic justification for search warrant nullification is community stability. Judges are important stewards of the "rule of law" and public
order, both of which can be promoted through nullification.
Like jury nullification and prosecutorial nullification, judicial nullification might be described as a conscious decision to quiet the law based on political
preferences or personal values-the dreaded "judicial bias." It need not be mistaken, however, for a way to "legislate from the bench." While nullification
sounds vaguely similar to the old boogeyman of "judicial activism," where a
judge imposes their own political ideology on society by interpreting old laws in

Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that

threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant").
229
Id. at 586.
230
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
231
Id. at 31. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); Payton, 445 U.S. at 586. In
2021, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split over a so-called "community caretaking" exception, unanimously concluding that it does not allow warrantless searches of a person's home.

Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596 (2021).
232
Bailey v. Swindell, 940 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37) (holding unconstitutional the warrantless tackling of a suspect by an officer
through the front door of suspect's home).
233
234
235

A warrantless search is a federal misdemeanor under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2236 (West 2021).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
Bailey, 940 F.3d at 1303.
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new and unpopular ways, nullification need not be partisan. Rather, judicial nullification can be justified on more pragmatic, community-minded grounds.
This subsection will first confront the idea that judicial nullification
would be "unrestrained" as proponents ofjudicial restraint might argue. Even the
loudest voices for judicial restraint weave community concerns throughout their
decision-making,23 6 thus a judge's mindfulness of community needs is not outside the bounds of supposedly restrained judging. The subsection will then explain why community-minded warrant nullification can be pragmatic rather than
"political."
One counter-argument to nullification, especially as exercised by judges,
is that nullification would jeopardize the institutional legitimacy of the courts,
which are supposed to be neutral and impartial at all times. Chief Justice John
Marshall wrote that "judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving
effect to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will
237
In dissent to the
of the legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law."
v. BarEducation
of
Board
Virginia
West
of
decision
Supreme Court's landmark
attitude"
personal
"purely
judge's
a
that
wrote
nette, Justice Felix Frankfurter
should not be relevant to their decision-making, and that no judge could be "jus238
tified in writing [their] private notions of policy" into the law.
More recently, supposed judicial restraint advocate Justice Antonin
Scalia repeatedly railed against what he saw as the improper imposition of his
239
In his dissent to
colleagues' personal values onto the rest of the country.
240
PlannedParenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v. Casey, for example, Justice Scalia denounced judicial "value judgment," "political choice," and "personal predilection" as indicative of "[t]he emptiness of [the] 'reasoned judg24
ment"' that produced cases like his arch-nemesis opinion, Roe v. Wade. 1Justice
Scalia also claimed to oppose the idea that judges should stand in for others in a
way similar to representative legislators stating, "Judges are selected precisely
for their skill as lawyers; whether they reflect the policy views of a particular
242
constituency is not (or should not be) relevant."
However, just because he belittled his colleagues' value judgments as
bogus and representative only of an elite, insular constituency does not mean
Justice Scalia opposed community-minded judicial decision-making in practice,

236

See Joseph S. Diedrich, Article Ill, JudicialRestraint, and This Supreme Court, 72 SMU L.

REV. 235 (2019).
237
Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824). Chief Justice Marshall's personal
dedication to judicial restraint is of course belied by Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
238
319 U.S. 624, 646-47 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See generally United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 778 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
239
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
505 U.S. 833, 983 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
240
241

See 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

242

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 717 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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even on questions of constitutional interpretation, where he claimed to be a textualist first and an originalist second. 243 In fact, Justice Scalia argued that the
Court should be deferential to democracy and "the longstanding traditions of
American society." 24 More than once, he paid tribute to legislative will by approvingly listing its traditional moral prohibitions. 24 He even sometimes cited
current political sentiment, not just "traditional" values, to bolster his constitutional arguments. 246 To claim that Justice Scalia opposed either value-driven or
community-mindful judging is to ignore Justice Scalia's actual judicial opinions.
Justice Scalia was not alone. Many allegedly "restrained" judges frequently weave social concerns into their decision-making and their written opinions, but they do so usually in one direction only: in support of ever-increasing
law enforcement power. Conservative judicial opinions in cases of murder, rape,
and other violent acts, for example, often begin with gruesome and graphic descriptions of the crimes, even when those details are irrelevant to the legal issue
to be resolved, probably in order to appeal to a sense of collective outrage.
An example of this is Justice Clarence Thomas's concurrence to the denial of certiorari in Price v. Dunn.247 Christopher Price was sentenced to death
for murder in Alabama. 248 The Supreme Court denied his last-minute attempt to
avoid execution over a dissent by Justice Stephen Breyer.24 9 Even though his side
prevailed, Justice Thomas still wrote separately (joined by Justices Samuel Alito
and Neil Gorsuch) to "set the record straight" and scold Breyer and the three
other dissenters who joined him for omitting "any discussion of the murder that
warranted petitioner's sentence of death" from his procedurally focused opinion.25 0 Justice Thomas then carefully recounted the gruesome facts of the case,
describing exactly how Price "brutally attacked" a minister with a sword and
making sure to note that the victim "died a slow, lingering, and painful death.""
Even though these details were not dispositive to the legal question presented in

243

See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23-29,

244

Casey, 505 U.S. at 980 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

37-41

(1997).

245
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589-90 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
246
McCreary Cnty. v. Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 889 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)

("[H]ow can the Courtpossiblyassert that the 'First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality
between ... religion and nonreligion' .. .? Who says so? Surely not the words of the Constitution.
Surely not the history and traditions that reflect our society's constant understanding of those
words. Surely not even the currentsense of our society....") (emphasis added).

139 S. Ct. 1533 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Price v. State, 725 So.2d 1003, 1034-35 (Ala. 1998), aff'd, Exparte Price,
725 So.2d 1063,
1065 (Ala. 1998).
247

248

249

Price, 139 S. Ct. at 1533.

250

Id. at 1533-34.
Id. at 1534.

251
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the petition, Justice Thomas made sure to serve up the blood and guts regardless. 22
The most excessive example of Justice Thomas' blood-dripping juris23
prudence is his concurrence to Glossip v. Gross. Again criticizing Justice
Breyer for sterilizing the details of capital punishment cases that have come before the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas wrote:
We owe victims more than this sort of pseudoscientific assessment of their lives. It is bad enough to tell a mother that her
child's murder is not "worthy" of society's ultimate expression
of moral condemnation. But to do so based on cardboard stereotypes or cold mathematical calculations is beyond my comprehension. In my decades on the Court, I have not seen a capital
crime that could not be considered sufficiently "blameworthy"
to merit a death sentence (even when genuine constitutional er2 4
rors justified a vacatur of that sentence). s
Justice Thomas then, over the next three pages of his opinion, meticu2
lously describes the brutal factual details of 11 different capital cases. " This
shock-value jurisprudence channels (and perhaps seeks to stoke) public outrage
25
and demand for fatal retribution in cases of violent crime. ' It is keenly community-minded. For what other reason would an appellate judge declare that "we
owe" crime victims a graphic retelling of their violent demise when deciding
questions of law? Neither the Constitution nor any criminal statutes impose such
an obligation.
It is unreasonable to believe that judges, even those who most frequently
beat the drum of "restraint," can make decisions totally detached from their own
257
values or the world around them. Judges are human beings who live and work
among other human beings. Their job is to assist in the resolution of disputes
between human beings and in the administration of laws made by human beings.
They are not skin-draped computers or algorithms in robes. Arguably, their decision-making is always community-minded-that is, rooted in a concern for the
order and health of the communities in which they are members.
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According to "popular constitutionalists" and other groups of restraintminded theorists, deference to the two political branches of government is the
appropriate method of judicial restraint. 258 The whims of the legislature and the
imperatives of the executive reflect the will of the people, thus, judges who want
to adjudicate with "the people" in mind should defer to their authority.
According to David Pozen, "lurking" in this theory of political deference
"is another possibility: that the judge ought to incorporate into [their] decisionmaking calculus the beliefs of the citizenry, to the extent [they] can perceive
them, irrespective of what the legislature or executive has done." 2 59 After all,
legislative and executive acts are not always reflective of public consensus.
Courtesy of gerrymandering, the high cost of political campaigns, the Electoral
College, and other factors, the legislative and executive branches of the states
and federal government are not necessarily representative of a majority of "the
people." 26 0
Community-minded judges ought instead to broaden their social assessment and "draw upon public perceptions and the prevailing state political climate
when resolving difficult disputes." 261 Pozen calls this approach "majoritarian judicial review," where judges manipulate "interpretive outcomes to promote what
the public appears to desire," rather than simply deferring to what the political
branches demand. This approach is more concerned with the community's views
than the judge's individual views.
Whatever we call this judicial approach, whether "community-minded,"
"socially-minded," "policy-minded," "majoritarian," or even "populist," it probably needs a limiting principle of some sort. Judge Richard Posner offers one in
his book How Judges Think
[A]s long as the populist element in adjudication does not swell
to the point where unpopular though innocent people are convicted of crimes, or other gross departures from legality occur,
conforming judicial policies to democratic preferences can be
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regarded as a good thing in a society that prides itself on being
the world's leading democracy."262
Search warrant nullification poses no risk of convicting unpopular
though innocent people of crimes. It poses no risk of convicting anyone of
crimes; thus, the first risk Judge Posner warns against does not apply. Would
warrant nullification give rise to "gross departures from legality," the other danger against which Judge Posner warns? Arguably not. Warrant nullification, in
today's political and legal climate, might actually reduce the overall chaos now
occurring under the guise of "the rule of law." The trauma, injuries, and deaths
caused by militarized police searches pile upon whatever underlying criminality
they are supposedly rooting out.
Obviously, warrant nullification may result in some people getting away
with drug possession or other crimes, but a pragmatic judge may conclude that
catching every criminal is not worth the harm caused by how they are caught. As
the Supreme Court held in Tennessee v. Garner, "[i]t is not better that felony
2 63
Whatever social benefit is to be had by
suspects die than that they escape."
catching people with contraband can reasonably be weighed against the social
harm caused by sending militarized police through their front door in the middle
of the night with battering rams, assault rifles, and flash-bang grenades.
Judges have the power to ease tensions as conflicts over state violence
once again flare-up on the streets of the United States. The criminal justice system, through the heavy hand of police officers and prosecutors, is counter-pro2
ductively fueling protests, disorder, and civil disobedience nationwide. " Dis265
trust in law enforcement and the criminal justice system is growing. Moreover,
these actions are sowing racial discord because this distrust is especially intense
among Black Americans.2 6 6 Ironically, it is the judges, through nullification, who
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dropped from 57% to 48% between June 2017 and June 2020, while the same level of support for
the criminal justice system dropped from 27% to 24% during the same time span and was ten points
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may have some power to restore confidence in the rule of law by selectively
turning off its most aggressive manifestations.
Justice Harry Blackmun observed in Georgia v. McCollum that a criminal justice system detached from the community in which it operates-detached
from common sense and unconcerned with maintaining public harmony-is a
system that truly lacks legitimacy.267 "Public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial system is essential for preserving community peace in [cases] involving
race-related crimes." 2 68 Indeed, "[i]n such cases, emotions in the affected community will inevitably be heated and volatile." 2 69 In McCollum, Justice
Blackmun was specifically describing the social harm caused by discriminatory
jury selection, but this principle extends to all aspects of the criminal process,
including warrant issuance.
Would warrant nullification in this context, therefore, be an exercise of
political will, a judicial partiality borne from anti-racist or anti-authoritarian politics, perhaps? Or, would it be a flex of purely personal whim? Neither need be
the case. Like jury nullification, judicial nullification need not know any particular political ideology. 270
"The core of legal pragmatism," Judge Posner explains, "is pragmatic
adjudication, and its core is heightened judicial concern for consequences" rather
than formalistic rule-following for its own sake. 27' Furthermore, "sensible legal
pragmatism tells the judge to consider systemic, including institutional, consequences as well as consequences of the decision at hand." 272
Any judge guided in their decision-making by practical consequences
must take a hard look at search warrants. As explained in Part IV, the first "practical consequence" of many search warrants is a heavily armed team of police
officers storming through the doors and windows of a person's home at night
without any kind of warning just to prevent someone from getting high. 273 The
second practical consequence is that a resident, bystander, or an officer, may be
killed, injured, or seriously traumatized in the raid. 274 In that case, the third practical consequence is that the community will hear about it and get angry, and may
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express that anger in days, weeks, or months of disruptive anti-police protests,
275
riots, or revenge attacks on officers. The fourth practical consequence may be
reactionary violence against protesters by police, police supporters, and rightwing militias. 276 The fifth practical consequence will be increased distrust and
disobedience by everyone toward legitimate institutions, including police departments, mayoral offices, city councils, criminal courts, and government in general. 277 The sixth practical consequence is long-term trauma and stress in the
community as a whole. 278
Therefore, community-minded judicial pragmatists could conclude that
the practical consequences of militarized police raids are just not worth whatever
gains they claim to make, and thus decide to reject search warrant applications,
even when there is probable cause, in order to increase social harmony and cohesion. 279 Police executing search warrants as they do is creating turmoil for individuals and municipalities alike. Search warrant nullification would be one tool
in the community-minded judge's adjudicative toolbox to help restore public
confidence in the criminal justice system.
This argument may seem like advocacy for biased adjudication, which
most agree is a bad thing. John Bell wrote that "[w]here a judge openly supports
one section of the community, his reputation for being willing to listen with equal
280
attention to the views of all sections of the community will be impaired." What
this Article calls "community-minded" judging should not be misconstrued as
"community-biased" judging, where a nullifying judge favors the interests of
criminal suspects and social justice advocates over the interests of police and
crime victims. However, a judge who nullifies search warrant applications out of
concern for community health would be erring on the side of all citizens against
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the militarized tactics of government law enforcement, not one group of citizens
over another. Innocent people and officers are killed in police raids, too, and
bystanders have been injured (and businesses damaged) when anger over these
deaths spills into the streets in the form of demonstrations or even riots.
Most judges already favor, at least implicitly, the communities and interests of people most like judges. 281 "[J]udges are themselves often members of
the dominant group and therefore have the luxury of seeing their perspectives
mirrored and reinforced in major social and political institutions." 28 2 Community-minded pragmatism simply expands that inherent favoritism to the interests
of others in the community. Everyone has an interest in the security of their
homes, their bodily health, and calm in their community, whether they are a criminal suspect or not. For these reasons, search warrant nullification need not be
mistaken as partisan activism or political bias. It could be a pragmatic effort by
judges to mitigate the deadly practical consequences of modern policing.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Admittedly, rejecting all warrant applications as a matter of course is a
radical leap few judges today would be willing to take. As Part II of this Article
explained, judges are often the loudest critics of nullification by other criminal
justice actors, and Part V showed how many judges enthusiastically embrace a
role as police auxiliary. And though Part III showed how vast judicial discretion
can be when it comes to issuing warrants, most judges probably feel that they are
obligated by their oaths to issue warrants, at least when probable cause is obvious.
Yet, judges live in the same world as everyone else, a world where militarized police officers are killing, injuring, and traumatizing people in the name
of law and order. Judges live in the same world where months-long protests and
even riots disrupt cities across the country, where reactionary backlash leaves
people dead in the streets, and where people are losing faith in legitimate institutions. Judges are not passive observers but active participants in making the
world this way. They have the power to change it.
Search warrant nullification is one possible judicial response to the social problems created by our militarized law enforcement machine. It need not
be a political response, but a pragmatic one, rooted in concerns for judicial independence, harm reduction, and community. Judges are not compelled-by law
or by rules against impartiality-to enable police to pursue criminals in ways that
may be disproportionate, unnecessary, or socially harmful. Just as jurors and
prosecutors have the power to turn off the law when it works in unjust ways, so
too do judges.
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